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Michael E. Solimine*

Forum-Selection Clauses and the
Privatization of Procedure

Introduction
Like millions of Americans every year,' Eulala Shute took an excursion

on a cruise ship. The Tropicale, operated by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
("Carnival"),2 took Mrs. Shute and her husband from Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico, to Los Angeles. While off Mexico, she was injured during a
tour of the galley. Eventually she brought suit against Carnival in federal court in the state of Washington, her place of residence, to recover
damages for personal injuries. The ticket provided by Carnival, however, had a forum-selection clause directing that all litigation must be
pursued in a court in the state of Florida, Carnival's principal place of
business. Last Term, the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute3 upheld the validity of the clause, requiring Mrs. Shute to litigate
her claim, if at all, in Florida.
Forum-selection clauses 4 have become increasingly common in civil
litigation. These clauses have many virtues. They permit parties to
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. B.A., Wright State
University (1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981). I thank Carolyn Kraft and
Susan Sauter for their research assistance and the University of Cincinnati College of
Law for financial support. I also thank Barry Friedman, Lea Brilmayer, Dan
Hofiheimer, Earl Maltz, Harold Maier, Richard Myers, Richard Posner, Bill Richman
and Joseph Tomain for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. None of the
above-mentioned necessarily agree with the views expressed here.
1. Joseph B. Treaster, CruiseLines Ride a High Tide, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 28, 1987, at
D1 (three million people took a cruise in 1987; as of 1987, about five percent of the
American population had taken a cruise).
2. Carnival Cruise Lines advertises itself as the world's largest cruise line, based
on the number of passengers carried. Daniel F. Cuff, Carnival CruisesChiefAdds Chairman's Title, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1990, at D2. Cf. Laurie M. Grossman, Carnival Cruise
Discusses Investing in Seabourn Line, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1991, at A16 (quoting analyst
who stated that Carnival "is definitely the McDonald's of the cruise industry").
3. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
4. Forum-selection clauses are also referred to as choice-of-forum clauses,
forum clauses, jurisdiction agreements, etc. Any differences in these terms are unimportant for the purposes of this Article; the phrases will be used interchangeably. See
M. Richard Cutler, Comparative Conflicts of Law: Effectiveness of Contractual Choice of
Forum, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 97, 98 n.3 (1985) (cataloguing various terms and making
same point).
25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 51 (1992)
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select a desirable, perhaps neutral, forum in which to litigate disputes.
Such planning permits orderliness and predictability in contractual relationships, obviating a potentially costly struggle at the outset of litigation over jurisdiction and venue. Preselecting a forum also reduces the
possibility of parallel lawsuits between parties in different fora.5 As
illustrated by the Carnival case, courts over the past two decades have
increasingly rejected challenges to the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find a recent case which refuses
to enforce such clauses. 6 For these reasons, then, it is not surprising
that lawyers are now routinely encouraged to place such clauses in contracts they prepare, 7 a trend that is bound to increase given the recent
tendency of business disputes to wind up in court.8
The rise of forum-selection clauses is a manifestation of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional and related matters.
Not coincidentally, the last two decades have also seen the enforcement
of contractual choice-of-law clauses, and the upholding of waivers of
personal jurisdiction and service-of-process requirements. These developments, however, have not passed without criticism. Doctrinally, a
number of questions regarding forum-selection clauses remain in the
wake of Carnival.9 These issues include the appropriate source of law to
govern the validity and interpretation of such clauses, and the content of
the consent to be demanded of a party agreeing to a preselected forum.
Normatively, some writers remain unconvinced of purported benefits of
such clauses. On that score, for example, it can be argued that the consent reflected in forum-selection clauses is unlikely to be genuine, and
may often be the product-for those in positions like Ms. Shute's-of
unequal bargaining power. Likewise, the forum chosen may be
extremely inhospitable to one party, so much so that litigation may not
be pursued at all.
This Article addresses the prospects and problems for forum-selection clauses. Part I of the Article summarizes the state of the law regarding such clauses. Initially, Part I considers the Supreme Court decisions,
culminating in Carnival,which have given the impetus to the rise of such
5.

See generally GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION

IN UNITED STATES COURTS

172 (1989); James T. Gilbert, Choice-of-Forum Clauses in

International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. LJ. 1, 2-3 (1976); Leandra Lederman,
Note, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in
Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 422-23 (1991).
6. See infra Parts I.B. & III.C. for discussions of those few cases in which courts
have refused to enforce such clauses.
7.

See, e.g., ROBERT A. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS TO YOUR PRACTICE 70-71 (1989); Edward W. Stem, Lawyers Can Reduce Possibility
of Defending in Out-of-State Court, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 28, 1988, at 20.

8. Terence Dungworth, Marc Galanter & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court:
Recent Trends in American Business Litigation (paper delivered at annual meeting
of Law & Society Assoc., Berkeley/Oakland, Cal., May 3 1-June 3, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, The

Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 942-46.
9. Please excuse this and all other nautical puns.
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clauses after a long period of judicial disapproval. Part I next considers
the discordant strains in the score, namely, those few states that still
refuse to enforce the clauses, and the academic criticisms of delegating
such power to private parties.
Part II of the Article evaluates and attempts to clarify the doctrinal
confusion over three broad topics relevant to forum-selection clauses.
First, it considers whether individuals can contractually waive the dueprocess right to the protections of personal jurisdictional barriers and
whether such waivers should be respected by courts. Second, Part II
concludes that in diversity and most federal question cases, state law
should govern the validity and interpretation of choice-of-forum clauses.
The third portion of Part II argues that the best paradigm for interpreting choice-of-forum clauses coincides with present doctrine and
embraces a contractual model that treats forum-selection clauses as it
would any other contractual provisions. Finally, Part II considers factors
related to consent (such as the relevance of the presence of a choice-oflaw clause), and reconsiders several cases, including Carnival.
Part III considers three possible obstacles, drawn from positive and
common law, to the increasing use of forum-selection clauses. Part III
first addresses federal and state statutory provisions that may preempt,
in whole or in part, the enforcement of such clauses. Part III next considers the relationship between forum-selection clauses and statutes or
doctrines that permit the transfer of cases, for reasons of convenience,
to other jurisdictions. Lastly, Part III addresses the international implications that occur when clauses direct that litigation must take place in a
foreign country.
The final Part of the Article addresses some broader implications of
the trend toward respecting party autonomy in procedural matters. Part
IV focuses on one aspect of the debate concerning the pros and cons of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), under the rubric of
metaprocedure, which is apt to be highly critical of enforcement of
forum-selection clauses, particularly those outside the commercial context. Part IV posits that most forum-selection clauses should be
enforced, and indeed stand up well to the criticisms directed toward
ADR and other reflections of party autonomy.
I. An Overview of Forum-Selection Clauses
A. Sailing from The Bremen to Carnival
The story of forum-selection clauses has been discussed in detail elsewhere;' 0 only the broad outlines need be sketched here. In general, the
clauses operate in two ways. When litigation is commenced in ajurisdiction designated by the clause, there is personal jurisdiction by consent,
orprorogation. But if one party brings suit in a court, which otherwise has
10. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 278-84, 351-63
(1982); Gilbert, supra note 5, at 7-28; Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in Internationaland Interstate CommercialAgreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 138-49.
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jurisdiction over the parties, but is not the court designated by the
clause, then there is said to be derogation. At that point, the court must
decide whether to proceed with litigation, or respect the clause by dismissing the action or transfering the case to the chosen forum. I
It was the derogation question that fueled much of the long-time
judicial hostility toward choice-of-forum clauses. Critics argued that the
parties lacked power contractually to "oust" a court of otherwise proper
jurisdiction, that enforcing such clauses would cause inconvenience and
inconsistency, and that the clauses were against public policy.' 2 These
rationales could not bear the weight placed on them. The "ouster" concept, for example, misconceives the real issue, which is whether a court
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in a case in favor of a forumselection clause. Thus, the problem is not one of improperly delegating
judicial power to private parties.' 3 Similarly, permitting parties to contract over jurisdiction would appear to increase, not decrease, consistency and convenience for both judges and litigants, while the
proverbial "public policy" escape hatch was nothing more than a bald
4
conclusion.'
Despite the conceptual weakness of the traditional rationales, judicial hostility toward choice-of-forum clauses continued well into the
1960s. Even then, however, a trend toward enforcing such clauses was
an emerging, if still minority, view. 15 The trend was reflected in the late
1960s by the American Law Institute's revision of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws calling for choice-of-forum clauses to be enforced
unless they were "unfair or unreasonable."' 6 Under this emerging
I1. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 10, at 352.
12. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 8. While these were the ostensible reasons advanced
in the case law, some writers have suggested that other reasons accounted for the
hostility. For example, courts also evinced hostility toward other aspects of party
autonomy-such as arbitration or choice-of-law clauses-and were concerned that
choice-of-forum clauses often appeared in contracts of adhesion. Id. at 9. More
crassly, the hostility is also thought to stem from a time when judges were paid based
on the number of cases they heard. Id.
"Contracts of adhesion" is the rubric for form- or take-it-or-leave-it-contracts,
"under which the only alternative to complete adherence is outright rejection." 1 E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 480 (1990) (footnote omitted).
13. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 375-76 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) (describing and criticizing ouster theory).
14. Willis L. M. Reese, The ContractualForum: Situation in the United States, 13 AM. J.
COMp. L. 187, 188-89 (1964).

15. For a discussion of the case law and academic commentary prior to 1972, see
Gilbert, supra note 5, at 11-19; Gruson, supra note 10, at 138-47.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). The first Restatement had rejected any deference to forum-selection clauses. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
The original version of § 80 stated: "The parties' agreement as to the place of the
action cannot oust a state ofjudicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given
effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 80 (1971). An amendment in 1986 to § 80 excised any reference to the
ouster theory (thus deleting the words "cannot... agreement"), since it was "unnecessary to state the obvious fact in the black-letter rule that the parties cannot by their
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view, fairness and reasonableness were to be gauged primarily by
whether contractual particulars were met, and whether the chosen
forum would seriously impair one party's ability to pursue a cause of
17
action.
Thus, it seems likely that the older view would have been eventually
eclipsed. But the shift was powerfully accentuated in the last two
decades by a cluster of Supreme Court decisions that bestowed approval
upon forum-selection clauses. 18 The first case was National Equipment
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,19 which upheld the appointment of an agent for
service of process in conformity with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
In the course of that decision, the Court opined that "it is settled...
that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing
'20
party, or even to waive notice altogether."
Szukhent was a rather unexceptional diversity action involving the
alleged breach of a lease of equipment by defendants in Michigan from a
plaintiff in New York. It seemed to set the stage, however, for the
Court's dramatic decision eight years later, in 1972, in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. 2 1 The Bremen involved a contract between German
and American corporations to tow a drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy.
The contract contained clauses providing that all disputes under the
contract would be brought before the Court of Justice in London, England, and disclaiming any liability by the German towing company for
damages to the towed rig.2 2 After the tow was underway, the rig was
damaged in a storm and taken to Tampa, Florida. There, Zapata, the
American company, sued in federal district court in admiralty for negligence and breach of contract, despite the choice-of-forum clause.
In sweeping language, the Court enforced the clause in The Bremen.
agreement oust a state ofjudicialjurisdiction." RESTATEMENT
OF

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT

LAws § 80 reporter's note (1988 Supp.).
17. See, e.g., Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810 (Pa.

1965);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 80 cmt. a & reporter's note

(1971). See generally Gilbert, supra note 5, at 11-19. Perhaps the burgeoning of court
dockets of the last two decades was a further reason for courts to look favorably upon
a safety valve which might alleviate the pressure (although adding to it in another
forum).
18. One Supreme Court decision, Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22

(1988), appeared to take a less positive view toward such clauses, and it is addressed
infra, Part I.B.

19. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
20. Id. at 315-16. Szukhent did not involve a forum-selection clause. The contract
in question simply designated an employee of the plaintiff company "as agent for the
purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York." Id. at 313
(footnote omitted). Strictly speaking, the clause did not waive personal jurisdiction
barriers, much less designate New York as a, or the, forum to resolve disputes under

the contract. But given that service of process was in effect waived, and service was
effectuated in New York, the clause "must have meant to confer jurisdiction on New
York courts."

LEA BRILMAYER

1990).
21. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
22. Id. at 2-3.

& JAMES A.

MARTIN, CONFLICT OF

LAws 498 (3d ed.
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Recognizing the split in the case law of the time, 23 the Court held that
"such clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under
the circumstances." ' 24 For support, the Court relied on Szukhent and the
Second Restatement, among other things. 25 The Court emphasized
freedom of contract and the utility of promoting certainty and predictability in international trade. 26 Several considerations informed the
Court's reasonableness inquiry. The Court noted that the contract was
"unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power," 2 7 and that it was not seriously inconvenient for the parties to
litigate in London. 28 Likewise, the Court brushed aside the argument
that the exculpatory clauses, which apparently conflicted with American
admiralty law,2 9 would be enforced in the English court. Here, the
Court said, American public policy was obviated by the international
30
aspects of the agreement.
However The Bremen test might be characterized, 3 ' it clearly displayed a generally benign attitude toward forum-selection clauses.
Although the case is restricted to admiralty with international overtones,
The Bremen has had a pervasive precedential effect upon state courts.3 2
23. Id. at 10-11.
24. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The Court later added that the burden of proof
lay with the party seeking to invalidate such a clause. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 11-12. Professor Mullenix has argued that The Bremen's analysis "consists of little more than conclusory pronouncements and dicta elevated into received
dogma." Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 306 (1988). She
argues, for example, that reliance on Szukhent is unpersuasive, since the operative
language drawn from that opinion was dicta, and hardly reflected the prevailing view
at the time. Id. at 307-11. Mullenix's analysis is persuasive but somewhat beside the
point. Whatever the shortcomings of the Szukhent opinion, The Bremen did not rely
solely on it and The Bremen fairly described the split in authority at the time. Moreover, admiralty jurisdiction has long been held to be a repository of federal common
law power. See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990). Thus, The
Bremen result was justified as an exercise of that power.
26. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9-12, 15.
27. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 16-18.
29. Id. at 15 n.17.
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 5, at 32 (describing The Bremen as a "reasonableness" test); Gruson, supra note 10, at 163 (arguing The Bremen establishes a two-part
test: reasonableness and fraud); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 356-60 (noting general
uncertainty as to the precise parameters of The Bremen test).
32. Commentaries at the time, e.g., Harold G. Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata:
Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387
(1973) and today, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 25, at 299, 313, note that it was unclear
whether The Bremen was announcing a federal common law rule binding on all courts
in all cases, or one with merely persuasive force outside the admiralty context. While
some courts still profess uncertainty as to this matter, see BORN & WESTIN, supra note
5, at 186-88 (giving examples), most courts seem to follow the latter view. For a
recent example, see Paul Business Systems, Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d
804, 807 (Va. 1990) (adopting The Bremen analysis). For a collection of the numerous
cases which have adopted The Bremen analysis for any forum-selection clause-domes-
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In succeeding cases, the Supreme Court supported party autonomy by
enforcing arbitration clauses 3 3 and settlements 34 and, in dicta, contin35
ued to speak favorably of forum-selection clauses.
Such was the context of the Carnival decision. The Shutes had
purchased tickets, through a travel agent in their home state of Washington, for an excursion on a cruise ship operated by Carnival Cruise
Lines. The tickets were mailed to them, after purchase, from Carnival's
headquarters in Miami, Florida.3 6 The face of the ticket admonished the
reader to read the conditions on the last page, 3 7 and a paragraph on the
last page explicitly stated that all disputes arising out of the contract
38
would be exclusively litigated in a court located in Florida.
tic or international-and of those few cases which have not, see Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Validity of ContractualProvisions Limiting Place or Court in Which Action
May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984 & 1991 Supp.).
Indeed, given the importance in The Bremen of facilitating international trade, see
supra note 26 and accompanying text, one might argue that The Bremen does not
establish an across-the-board federal common law rule. Rather, it can be viewed as
restricted to cases in the international context. See Maier, supra; Lederman, supra
note 5, at 430. To provide certainty in international business dealings would arguably call for a federal, uniform rule-a result not necessarily compelled when persons
within the United States deal with each other. And the choice of forum may be especially important (as contrasted with the substantive law to be applied) in such cases.
Cf. note 132 infra. Hence, this argument would conclude, a federal common law rule
is not appropriate for domestic diversity or federal question cases, but would be
called for in such cases involving international elements. See infra Part II.B (discussing federal common law rule for choice-of-forum clauses). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MicH. L. REV. 1456, 1472-73 (1991) (book review
discussing how cases with international elements affect wholly domestic cases).
33. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)
(enforcing arbitration agreement over protest that it violates Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 626-634 (West Supp. 1991)); Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (arbitration enforced over
protest that it violates federal securities law and civil RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration enforced over protest that it violates federal antitrust laws).
34. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding releasedismissal agreement over argument that it violates policies of civil rights statute, 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
35. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (enforcement of "freely negotiated" forum-selection clause that is not "unreasonable and
unjust" does not offend due process, citing The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703
(1982) (parties may agree in advance to the jurisdiction of a given court, citing Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964)); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519
(1974) ("An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause. . ." and is upheld, relying on The Bremen, against
an argument that enforcement of an arbitration provision between an American company and a German citizen would impair the federal securities laws.).
36. 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1991).
37. The first page stated:
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT - ON LAST PAGES 1, 2, 3.
Id.
38. The clause was in paragraph eight on the first of three pages of "terms and
conditions," which contained a total of 25 numbered conditions. The clause stated:

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol 25

Despite the clause, the Shutes sued Carnival in federal court in
Washington. Carnival raised two defenses: there was no personal jurisdiction over the company in Washington and, in any event, the forumselection clause required that suit be brought in Florida. The district
court agreed with the second ground and did not reach the first. 39 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Carnival's contacts with
Washington were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in that
40
state.
With regard to Carnival's alternative defense, the Ninth Circuit
declined to enforce the choice-of-forum clause. While acknowledging
that deference to such clauses was compelled by The Bremen, the appellate court argued that the parties here-unlike in The Bremen-were in
unequal bargaining positions, and that the clause was not bargained for
but "presented to the purchaser on a take-it-or-leave-it basis."'4 1 Moreover, the court held, the clause could not be upheld under The Bremen
rationale because the inconvenience of litigating in Florida would "for
all practical purposes [deprive them of their] day in court."'4 2 According
to the Ninth Circuit, there was "evidence in the record to indicate that
the Shutes are physically and financially incapable of pursuing this litiga'43
tion in Florida."
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court reversed
and enforced the forum-selection clause, finding it unnecessary to reach
the personal jurisdiction defense. 4 4 The Court noted that as this was an
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes
and matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this
Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State
of Florida, U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country.
Id. The dissenting opinion in Carnivalattached a facsimile of three pages to the opinion, id. at 1536-38, to demonstrate "that only the most meticulous passenger is likely
to become aware of the forum-selection provision." Id. at 1529 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
39. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 387 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 1522 (1991) (describing this aspect of the district court decision).
40. As noted by the Supreme Court, 111 S.Ct. at 1525 n.**, the opinion below
was the third filed by the Ninth Circuit. In the second opinion, the court certified a
question of personal jurisdiction, concerning the state long-arm statute, to the Washington Supreme Court. The court refiled its opinion upon receipt of the Washington
Supreme Court's opinion.
41. 897 F.2d at 388.
42. Id. at 389 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18).
43. Id. The court did not elaborate on this conclusion, either at this point or
earlier in the opinion, when it made a similar assertion. Id. at 387.
44. Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991). According to
the Supreme Court, it granted certiorari "to address the question whether the Court
of Appeals was correct in holding that the District Court should hear [the Shutes']
tort claim against [Carnival]." Id. More specifically, though, it appears that the case
presented the opportunity to resolve two splits of authority. The first, as recounted
by the Ninth Circuit, 897 F.2d at 383-86, is over how to determine whether a claim
"arises out" of a defendant's activities in the forum state, in order to determine the
propriety of exercising specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The second, while not specifically mentioned by the Ninth Circuit, was over the validity of

1992

Forum-Selection Clauses

admiralty case federal law governed the enforceability of the clause, and
that the Shutes had notice of and knowledge of the clause. 4 5 The Court
then reviewed its holding and reasoning in The Bremen,46 and acknowledged that the facts differed from those in The Bremen. The Shute-Carnival agreement was a form contract not subject to negotiation and was
'4 7
between parties obviously not in "bargaining parity."
Nevertheless, the Court enforced the choice-of-forum clause.
"[W]e must," the Court held, "refine the analysis of The Bremen to
account for the realities of form passage contracts." 48 The Court then
proceeded to engage in Chicago School economic analysis. 49 Simply
because the form ticket contract was not negotiated does not mean it is
never enforceable, since "[i]ncluding a reasonable forum clause in a
form contract of this kind well may be permissible ....-50 The Court
gave three reasons. First, since a cruise ship typically serves passengers
from many fora, a cruise line has an interest in limiting the fora where it
might be subject to suit.5 1 Second, "a clause establishing ex ante the
forum for dispute resolution" 5 2 spares litigants the time and expense of
forum-related motions. Third, "it [stood] to reason" that passengers
purchasing such tickets "benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting
the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may
53
be sued."1
Having distinguished the facts of The Bremen, the Court also found
that the "inconvenience" test of that case was met. The Court stated
that there was nothing in the record to support the Ninth Circuit's holdchoice-of-forum clauses in cruise tickets. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-11,
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). The Third Circuit had
taken a less hostile view of such clauses. See Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed AltriGestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989). While

the Carnival majority did not explicitly resolve this split (though it did make passing
reference to the Hodes case, 111 S. Ct. at 1527), the result of the case clearly favors
the Hodes view of forum-selection clauses.
45. Carnival, 111 S.Ct. at 1525-26.
46. Id. at 1526-27.
47. Id. at 1527.
48. Id.
49. Some writers have taken the Court to task for not consistently engaging in
rigorous economic analysis in cases involving contractual, business or regulatory
matters. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term -

Forward: The

Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1984). Perhaps it is no coincidence
that Justice Blackmun also wrote the Court's opinion in East River Steamship Corp.
v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (in admiralty cases, economic loss
obtainable only under contract, not tort, remedies), a textbook example of Chicago
School economic analysis. See Michael E. Solimine, Recovery of Economic Damages in
Products Liability Actions and the Reemergence of ContractualRemedies, 51 Mo. L. REv. 977,
987-88 (1986). Likewise, it is no shock that the Carnival opinion also cited Judge
Richard Posner's opinion in Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372
(7th Cir. 1990), see Carnival, 111 S.Ct. at 1527, discussed infra, Part II.C.
50. 111 S. Ct. at 1527.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id.
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ing that the inconvenience to the Shutes would be intolerable. 54 Likewise, the Court held, Florida was not a "remote alien forum," the sort of
forum envisioned by The Bremen which might justify a finding of inconvenience. 55 While the "forum-selection clauses contained in form passage contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental
fairness," 5 6 there was no indication of bad-faith by Carnival, 57 nor that
the clause was obtained "by fraud or overreaching." 5 8s Indeed, the
Shutes "presumably retained the option of rejecting the contract with
impunity." 59 For these reasons, the Court held that the forum-selection
clause should be enforced.
In the final part of the opinion, the Court considered the argument,
not reached below, 60 that the clause violated the provisions of a federal
statute, the Limited Liability Act, 6 ' which regulates cruise ship contracts. The Act declares void any contractual provision that exculpates
the ship owner from liability, or purports "to lessen, weaken, or avoid
the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction
...
"62 The Court held that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the statute evinced any Congressional intent to interdict
forum-selection clauses. The Court noted that the clause does "not take
54. Id. at 1527-28.
55. Id. at 1528.
56. Id.
57. Id. By this, the Court explained that it meant the clause was not "a means of
discouraging cruise passengers from pursuing legitimate claims," since Carnival "has
its principal place of business in Florida, and many of its cruises depart from and
return to Florida ports." Id. It is not entirely clear how one follows from the other.
Since, presumably, most cruise passengers are not from Florida, those from distant
states (or foreign countries) might find it cumbersome to bring suit in Florida. Moreover, passengers may not find it advantageous to litigate on Carnival's home turf. On
the other hand, any suit against Carnival is likely to require discovery of Carnival's
employees or documentation, both of which should be available to some degree in
Florida. And any judgment rendered against Carnival is presumably easily satisfied
in that state.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 389 n.12 (9th Cir. 1990)
(discussing but not deciding issue).
61. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988) (originally enacted as Act ofJune 5, 1936, ch.
521, sec. 4283B, § 2, 49 Stat. 1480 (1936)).
62.
It shall be unlawful for the ...owner of any vessel transporting passengers
between ports of the United States or between any such port and a foreign
port to insert in any rule, regulation, contract, or agreement any provision or
limitation (1) purporting, in the event of loss of life or bodily injury arising
from the negligence or fault of such owner or his servants, to relieve such
owner... from liability, or from liability beyond any stipulated amount, for
such loss or injury, or (2) purporting in such event to lessen, weaken, or
avoid the right of any claimant to a trial by court of competent jurisdiction on
the question of liability for such loss or injury, or the measure of damages
therefor. All such provisions or limitations contained in any such rule, regulation, contract, or agreement are declared to be against public policy and
shall be null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988).
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away" the Shutes' right to a court trial,6 3 and the legislative history indicates that the statute was primarily meant to limit arbitration clauses. 64
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Recognizing
the general rule that contracts, like forum-selection clauses, are usually
enforced as written, Justice Stevens argued that "two strands of traditional contract law" qualify this general rule and render this choice-offorum clause invalid. 6 5 One strand subjects contracts of adhesion to a
heightened "scrutiny for reasonableness." 6 6 Another strand, Justice
Stevens stated, is the still "prevailing view," notwithstanding The Bremen,
that "forum-selection clauses are not enforceable if they were not freely
bargained for, create additional expense for one party, or deny one
67
party a remedy."
Moreover, Justice Stevens found the clause in this case easily fell
under the purview of the Limited Liability Act. Referring to the language of the Act, he stated that the clause in question "certainly lessens
or weakens [the Shutes'] ability to recover" for the tort, since it "is safe
to assume" that witnesses can be more easily assembled in Washington
than in Florida. 68 Acknowledging that the Act does not specifically condemn forum-selection clauses, Justice Stevens argued that a "liberal
reading" of the Act was supported by its remedial purpose and its legislative history. 69 Justice Stevens observed that the history demonstrated
an intent to protect ship passengers like the Shutes,7 0 and it is not surprising that the history makes no reference to choice-of-forum clauses
since at the time of the Act's passage (1936), such clauses were generally
71
unenforceable under the common law.
B.

Dissenting Voices and Unanswered Questions

The trend in favor of forum-selection clauses has not been unanimously
supported. One pre-CarnivalSupreme Court decision is less solicitous
63. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528.
64. Id. at 1529.
65. Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1530-31. Justice Stevens observed that some commentators, e.g., Todd
Rakoff, Contractsof Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1983),
argue that due to lack of meaningful consent, contracts of adhesion should not be
enforced at all. 111 S. Ct. at 1531. The case law, in contrast, states "a less extreme
position and instead subjects terms in contracts of adhesion to scrutiny for reasonableness." Id. (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (Wright, J.)).
67. 111 S.Ct. at 1531 (citing Dougherty, supra note 32, at 409-38). For similar
reasons, Justice Stevens dissented in a personal jurisdiction case on the grounds that
the contract between a franchiser and franchisee that provided contacts with the
forum state was a contract of adhesion. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 487-90 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. l1l S. Ct. at 1532.
69. Id.
70. Id. He referred to a House Report which mentioned putting a stop to "arbitration" and to "practices of a like character." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2517, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936)).
71. Id.
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of such clauses; several states, even in the post-Bremen era, still refuse to
enforce the clauses; and significant doctrinal questions remain after
Carnival.
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,72 decided by the Supreme
Court three years prior to Carnival, involved a dispute arising out of a
dealership agreement, which contained a clause directing that all disputes be litigated in a federal or state court in New York City.7 3 Despite
that clause, one of the parties filed suit in diversity in federal court in
Alabama, apparently seeking to rely on Alabama law, which disfavors
such clauses. 74 The defendant then filed a motion to transfer the case to
federal court in New York under § 1404(a). 7 5 At first blush, this scenario seemed to present a classic Erie 7 6 question of whether federal or
state law governed.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that an extended
inquiry was unnecessary, since a federal statute, § 1404(a), was present
and was "sufficiently broad" to cover the matter in question. 7 7 Section
1404(a) was intended, the Court held, to permit district courts to adjudicate transfer motions "according to an 'individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.' "178 As part of that inquiry, a
court should consider the presence, or absence, of a forum-selection
clause as just one of several factors, state law to the contrary
79
notwithstanding.
In dissent, Justice Scalia observed that § 1404(a) makes no mention
of choice-of-forum clauses, and in his view the section is designed to
examine present or future facts, not retrospective ones-like a choiceof-forum clause.8 0 Given his conclusion that federal statutory law did
not govern the point, Justice Scalia applied the "twin aims" of Erie:
"discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws."'' s Under those criteria, Justice Scalia concluded that state law regarding forum-selection clauses should govern.8 2
72. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
73. Id. at 24 & n.1.
74. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
75. That provision states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
76. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that under the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), state substantive law
should apply in diversity cases).
77. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26.
78. Id. at 29 (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).
79. Id. at 29-30.
80. Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also argued that to achieve
"substantial uniformity of predictable outcome between federal and state courts," a
goal of Erie jurisprudence, "a broad reading [of a federal rule or statute] that would
create [such disuniformity] should be avoided if the text permits." Id. at 37-38.
81. Id. at 39 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). Justice
Scalia's summary of the Erie doctrine is consistent with the majority's own review of
Erie principles. Id. at 26-27 & nn.4-6.
82. Id. at 39-41.
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Stewart illustrated that not all states have embraced The Bremen's
solicitude toward choice-of-forum clauses. While counts vary, 8s it
appears that at least four states explicitly reject the modern trend and
hold all such clauses invalid per se,8 4 while the case law in several others
is unclear.8 5 The rationale of these courts for rejecting The Bremen has
not been fully explicated. Most of the cases simply reiterate the old view
that parties cannot by contract "oust" a court of otherwise competent
86
jurisdiction.
While the opinions are less than inspiring, the results reached have
not passed without sympathy in some quarters. Apparently no one
adheres to the traditional view holding all forum-selection clauses invalid, but some commentators are dubious of the solicitude afforded such
clauses. They note that many such clauses appear in contracts of adhe83. E.g., Richard D. Freer, Erie'sMid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1096 & n.31

(1989) (thirteen states); Allan R. Stein, Erie and CourtAccess, 100

YALE

LJ. 1935, 1980

n.216 (1991) (four states); Robert A. de By, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Substantive
or Proceduralfor Erie Purposes, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1071 (1989) (four states); Lederman, supra note 5, at 449 n.3 (three states).
84. The four states are: (1) Alabama: Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.
2d 554 (Ala. 1980); Keelean v. Central Bank of the South, 544 So. 2d 153 (Ala.

1989); (2) Georgia: Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, Inc., 209
S.E.2d 132 (Ga. App. 1974); (3) Iowa: Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph
Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1982); (4) Texas: Dowling v. NADW Mktg., Inc.,

578 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on othergrounds, 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.
1982).
Professor Freer lists thirteen states (not including Iowa) that "either expressly or
impliedly consider forum-selection clauses invalid per se as a general rule." Freer,
supra note 83, at 1096 n.31. Three of those states are listed above. In another three
states, the rule is unclear. See infra note 85. Of the remaining seven states, recent
cases have enforced forum-selection clauses. See Nelms v. Morgan Portable Bldg.
Corp., 808 S.W.2d 314 (Ark. 1991); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1986);
Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Diaz, 378 A.2d 108 (Conn. 1977); Ernest & Norman
Hart Bros. v. Town Contractors, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. App. 1984) (dicta);
Chase Third Century Leasing Co. v. Williams, 782 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. App. 1989);
General Electric Co. v. Keyser, 275 S.E.2d 289 (W. Va. 1981); Calanca v. D&S Mfg.
Co., 510 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. App. 1987).
85. The law of three states is unclear, based on older cases that have not been
revisited since The Bremen. See Bartlett v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500
(1859); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S.E. 362 (N.C. 1921); Pepin v.
Socibt6 St. Jean Baptiste, 49 A. 387 (R.I. 1901). Also, although the law in New York
is more recent, it remains unclear. Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 n.1 (2d Cir.
1990) (per curiam) (summarizing case law); Gruson, supra note 10, at 150-52 (same).
86. E.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc., 382 So. 2d at 556; Dowling, 578 S.W.2d at 476;
Cartridge Rental Network, 209 S.E.2d at 133 (two-paragraph discussion). Cf Davenport
Mach. & Foundry Co., 314 N.W.2d at 436-37 (characterizing The Bremen and similar
cases as a "growing minority" view and permitting a court to consider a forum-selection clause, "if otherwise fair," along with other factors in ruling on a motion to
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds).
Change may be coming in even these few states. In Alabama, for example, several
justices suggested that Redwing Carriers be limited to derogation, not prorogation,
cases. Keelean, 544 So. 2d at 159 (Maddox, J., concurring); id. at 159-60 (Steagale,J.,
concurring). This position, however, was expressly rejected by the majority opinion.
Id. at 155-56.
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sion, 8 7 and, more generally, that due-process values are sacrificed when
courts treat the clauses as they would any other contractual provision. 8
Even accepting The Bremen and its progeny, several significant doctrinal issues remain unresolved. Among these questions are: whether
federal law governs enforcement of a clause in a diversity action when
§ 1404(a) is not applicable; 89 whether federal law governs this issue in a
federal question case; 90 what the content of a federal rule should be, in
light of Carnival; what relevance a choice-of-law clause has to a forumselection clause; 9 1 and whether enforcing a forum-selection clause
waives a party's use of other jurisdictional devices, such as reliance on
the forum non conveniens doctrine. 9 2 The balance of this Article turns
to these and other questions.
H. Waiving Jurisdictional Rights Through Forum-Selection Clauses
A. Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Protections and of the Option to
Forum-Shop
The Supreme Court has frequently held that the litigant can waive "personal" constitutional rights but not "structural protections" embodied
in the Constitution. 93 This general paradigm is plagued by a number of
uncertainties. For example, the line dividing personal rights from structural concerns is not clear. 9 4 Nor is the content of the required waiver
certain. 95 Finally, it is not clear what significance, if any, should be
87. E.g.,

RuSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws

156-57

(3d ed. 1986); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 362.

88. E.g., Mullenix, supra note 25, at 296-97.
89. See Stein, supra note 83, at 1961 n.132; de By, supra note 83, at 1069; Freer,
supra note 83, at 1117; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374
(7th Cir. 1990). The majority in Stewart left this issue open. Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 n. 11(1988).
90. An issue left open in Stewart, 487 U.S. at 26 n.3. See also Mullenix, supra note
25, at 299, 313.
91. See Mullenix, supra note 25, at 301.
92. Id.
93. See Peretz v. United States, I11 S. Ct. 2661, 2669 (1991); Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2638-39 (1991); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1986). But see Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2647-50 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (some structural guarantees can be waived).
94. See Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2650 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that "which
constitutional provisions are 'structural'

. .

. is by no means clear."). Cf. Dennis v.

Higgins, 111 S. Ct. 865, 870-71 (1991) (discussion of same distinction).
95. For example, most criminal cases require that there be an "intentional relinquishment... of a known right ....
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
In contrast, waivers in civil cases seem to be governed, in whole or in part, by contract law principles. E.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392-94 (1987).
See generally Edward L. Rubin, TowardA General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478,
491-528 (1981) (noting this dichotomy and giving numerous examples of each);
Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Action, 34
VILL. L. REV. 429, 440-49 (1989) (noting apparent distinction even within civil cases;

some cases (e.g., Rumeiy) utilize contract principles while other cases (e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., I11 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)) focus on the public interests
of the right sought to'be waived); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930
F.2d 1390, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2892 (1991) (higher standard of
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attached to a waiver prior to litigation as compared to a post-filing
96
waiver or settlement.
To address these concerns, it is necessary to identify and examine
the nature of the rights waived in a forum-selection clause. In any lawsuit, the parties may have the option of suing each other in different
fora. A choice-of-forum clause limits the opportunity to shop for a
forum by preselecting one forum (or the courts in one state or jurisdiction) in which to litigate a dispute.
Most of these clauses also appear to waive rights to invoke the protections of personal jurisdiction. Those protections, derived from the
Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, generally require that a state
have "minimum contacts" with a defendant to enable it to adjudicate a
civil dispute involving that party. 97 Such protections can be explicitly
waived; of the examples discussed so far, the waiver in Szukhent comes
the closest. 98 On the other hand, the clauses in The Bremen, Stewart and
Carnival did not explicitly waive the minimum contacts barrier. Nonetheless, the clauses would not be effective unless the minimum contacts
barrier is considered to be waived. It does no good to preselect the
forum if one party can still contest personal jurisdiction or other venue
requirements .9

To what extent should personal jurisdiction and venue requirements
be waivable? It is well settled that a litigant may waive personal jurisdiction, but may never waive subject-matter jurisdiction.10 0 But why the
court review of settlement in civil cases may be appropriate for waiving constitutional, as opposed to statutory, rights).
96. Compare Cange v. Stotler & Co., Inc., 826 F.2d 581, 594 n.lI (7th Cir. 1987)
(arguing that prospective waivers of substantive statutory rights can "encourage violations of the law," and are to be distinguished from settlements of a dispute) and
McMorrow, supra note 95, at 463-65 (waiver is more problematic than settlement
since plaintiff is usually in a stronger bargaining position in the latter situation) with
Cange, 826 F.2d at 596 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (arguing that case law does not
reflect a distinction between settlements and waivers, nor should it, since "[t]o forbid
the contractual waiver is to make the class of statutory beneficiaries worse off, by
depriving them of the opportunity to obtain the benefits of the statutory entitlement
by using it as a bargaining chip in the process of contracting.") See also Freytag, 111 S.
Ct. at 2647 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting distinction between waiver and forfeiture and arguing that cases do not make distinction clear); General Contracting &
Trading Co., LLC v. Interpole, Inc., 940 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1991) (discussing
distinction between waiver of and consent to personal jurisdiction).
97. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its
progeny.
98. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The majority opinion read the
clause, authorizing an agent to accept service of process in New York, to "subject the
respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court in New York." National Equip.
Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 313 (1964) (footnote omitted).
99. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 175 n.16 ("Exclusive forum-selection
clauses will typically be interpreted as implicit submissions to the forum's jurisdiction."); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 376-77 (7th Cir.
1990). Ultimately, the issue comes down to one of contract interpretation. Part II.B.
infra argues that state contract law should usually apply.
100. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) ("A defense of lack ofjurisdiction over the
person ... is waived" if not raised in a motion or in a responsive pleading) with FED.
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difference? Why should not both be waivable, as some have argued? 10 '
The answer usually given is that federal courts are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction as determined by Congress under Article III of the Constitution. To permit subject-matter jurisdiction to be waived would flout this
limitation. On the other hand, personal jurisdiction is, as the term
10 2
implies, a personal right waivable by the individual.
This traditional answer seems unsatisfactory because subject-matter
limitations ultimately benefit the individual.' 0 3 Perhaps a better explanation proceeds along the personal right/structural guarantee dichotomy suggested above. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a separation-ofpower limitation between the legislature and the courts. To permit such
a structural barrier to be breached, even with consent of the parties,
would upset the checks and balances inherent in separation of powers.' 0 4 Waiver of subject-matter jurisdiction thus subjects non-litigants
to externalities. In contrast, a prospective litigant waiving a personaljurisdiction protection in large part only impinges upon herself. 10 5
The alternative method of examining waivable and non-waivable
jurisdictional rights sheds light on the nature of the rights being waived
by a forum-selection clause. While the traditional view holds that these
clauses do waive such rights, the consensus on that position is by no
means unanimous. Returning to personal jurisdiction, at one point the
Court seemed to think that personal-jurisdiction guarantees, while
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time or by
the court). See also Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2678 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial system is that a
claim going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point in the
litigation by any party.")
101. See, e.g., AMERICAN

LAW INsTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvisIoN OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 366-69 (1969); Robert J. Martineau, Subject

MatterJurisdictionas a New Issue on Appeak Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 33-34.
102. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 13, 181 (1985). Similar reasoning would presumably apply to the subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts.
Martineau, supra note 101, at 2.

103. As the Court itself seems to have recognized:
The challenge in this case goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the

court and hence its power to issue the order. The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal
metaphysics. It rests instead on the central principle of a free society that
courts have finite bounds of authority, some of constitutional origin, which

exist to protect citizens from the very wrong asserted here, the excessive use
ofjudicial power. The courts, no less than the political branches of the government, must respect the limits of their authority.
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
72, 77 (1988). See also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513 (1991).
104. Cf. Freytag, I11 S. Ct. at 2648 (Scalia, J., concurring) (identifying subject-matter jurisdiction as a nonwaivable structural guarantee).
105. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1405-08 (1989) (similar analysis regarding when corporations

may contract around rules of corporate law); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.

REV.

1416, 1434 (1989) (same).
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mainly protecting individual interests, also served to police state sovereignty.1 0 6 The Court has since retreated from this position to hold that
personal jurisdiction flows not from Article III, but from the Due Process Clause, and thus constitutes a waivable liberty interest.10 7 In this
context, consensual waiver, as reflected in a choice-of-forum clause,
1 08
seems unremarkable.
Perhaps doctrine too quickly abandoned the horizontal federalism,
or structural, prong of personal jurisdiction. Emphasizing state sovereignty concerns can help ensure, entirely apart from the parties' consent, that the forum is an appropriate place to adjudicate the dispute' 0 9
and that courts consider state regulatory interests in determining
whether the Due Process Clause is satisfied."10 Likewise, insisting that
the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state, notwithstanding a particular litigant's consent, helps reduce the number of
instances when a state will impose costs of defending suit on out-of-state
defendants. "' But even accepting this analysis does not render consensual jurisdiction problematic. The strength of these federalism interests
can be overstated. They are most often invoked by private litigants, and
106. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
107. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985); Insurance
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10
(1982).
108. One writer has recently argued that incoherency in the Court's personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence demonstrates that current doctrine "is really a solution in
search of a problem." Wendy Collins Perdue, PersonalJurisdictionand the Beetle in the
Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529, 530 (1991). The problem stems principally from the
Court's embrace of an imagined exchange of consent, between defendant and the
forum state, as the rationale for the minimum contacts requirement. See Allan R.
Stein, Styles ofArgument and InterstateFederalismin the Law of PersonalJurisdiction,65 TEx.
L. REV. 689, 699-703 (1987). Alternative rationales-such as the state's regulatory
interest, or simply the convenience to the defendant-have been deemphasized. Id.
at 698-99, 703-08. On the other hand, the consent rationale is also problematic,
largely because the exchange is wholly fictitious. Id. at 734-38. For these reasons,
some writers have posited still other rationales for personal-jurisdiction requirements, from a focus on the coercive power a state may exercise over a defendant, e.g.,
Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1989), to a focus on
burdening and discriminating against outsiders not represented in the forum's political process, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of PersonalJurisdiction,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 881 (1989). See generally Perdue, supra, at 534-60 (summarizing and critiquing new approaches).
What is remarkable about these varied rationales for personal-jurisdiction requirements is that all approve of valid or explicit consent-as embodied in a forum-selection clause-as the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra, at 24; Stein, supra, at 735. Cf. Perdue, supra, at 537.
109. Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of PersonalJurisdiction,60 U. COLO. L. REV.

5, 11 (1989).
110. Stein, supra note 108, at 738-56. Indeed, the Court purports to consider such
interests when determining the overall reasonableness of an assertion of personal
jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
111. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 609-10 (3d ed. 1986);
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction,
1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 94-96.
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rarely, if ever, by state officials.' 1 2 Moreover, the regulatory interests
emphasized by a federalism approach are served when a litigant agrees
1 13
to submit to jurisdiction in that state.
The other right waived in a forum-selection clause is the possible
option to forum shop. Forum shopping has gotten a bad name in some
circles, primarily because it undermines the illusion that litigants will be
treated identically in any forum.' 14 But forum shopping can be conceptualized as the simple search for a convenient and favorably biased
forum, 115 a search not unfair to a defendant absent some predetermined
baseline of fairness.116
Forum shopping, which some have spoken of in fairly lyrical
terms, 117 does not appear to spring from positive sources of law. It is
simply the manifestation of litigant autonomy, and the by-product of a
jurisdictional system that often provides numerous fora to bring suit.1 18
More so than personal jurisdictional rights, the option to forum shop is
a personal right with few, if any, structural attributes. Few externalities
are likely to be created if forum shopping is curtailed, especially when
the creation and enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses is, itself,
viewed as one form of forum shopping. 1 19 Therefore, the right to
112. But see Stein, supra note 108, at 745 (judge acts as agent of state and exercises
regulatory authority of forum when deciding personal-jurisdiction questions).
113. Id. at 756.
114. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1680-84 (1990)
(giving examples of traditional disfavor).
115. Perdue, supra note 108, at 560-73 (litigants care about convenience, bias, and
choice of law).
116. BRILMAYER & MARTIN, supra note 20, at 21; R. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF
LAws: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 178-79 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 313 n.1 17 (1990).
To be truly even-handed, one might argue that there should be an auction system
to enable the parties to purchase the appropriate forum. Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 608 n. 11
(1981). Enforcing contractually created forum-selection clauses is one type of auction system.
117. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 25, at 303 (right to choose a forum "is perhaps
the most fundamental and essential litigation right, since it carries with it choice-oflaw determinants"); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 325
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The right to have a case tried locally and be spared
the likely injustice of having to litigate in a distant or burdensome forum is as ancient
as the Magna Charta.") (footnote omitted).
118. See ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 1416-17 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the FederalJudiciary,36 UCLA L. REV. 233,
306 (1988).
119. Note, supra note 114, at 1680, 1688 n.86.
When a state's substantive law is favorable to certain litigants, that state, through
forum shopping, will attract litigation. Thus, "[b]y having power over defendants
and by catering to plaintiffs, a state can effectuate its own policies without accommodating the needs of other states." BRILMAYER, supra note 116, at 178. Whether this
phenomenon should be characterized as a race to the top or a race to the bottom is a
difficult and uncertain decision. Id. at 178-79. See also Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 69-70 (1989) (noting
similar difficulties in characterizing states' adoption of modern choice-of-law theories); supra note 116.
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forum shop should be waivable in such clauses.
Concluding that certain rights can be waived in a choice-of-forum
clause leaves open the questions of the standards to apply when considering the validity of particular clauses, as well as the appropriate source
of law for those standards. It is to those issues to which the balance of
this Part of the Article turns.
B.

Sources of Law: Federal Common Law or State Law

As noted above,' 20 the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
whether federal common law, as embodied in The Bremen analysis, governs the validity of forum-selection clauses in diversity or federal question cases, or whether reference to state law is appropriate. The
question is not merely academic for, as we have seen, a few states still
cling to the older view, rejected by The Bremen, of refusing to enforce any
choice-of-forum clause, or not favor such clauses to the extent that the
Bremen did. 12 1 If federal common law does govern forum-selection
clauses in these cases, The Bremen rule would govern all cases in federal
court as well as federal question (and perhaps other) cases brought in
state court. 122
To the extent one views forum shopping favorably, the enforcement of forumselection clauses arguably limits-though does not entirely discard-such shopping.
Perhaps such a regime does create some externalities, since a state will be deprived of
forum shopping plaintiffs, routed elsewhere through the choice-of-forum clause. But
these externalities should cancel out, since the aforementioned state can be the recipient of litigation through the enforcement of such clauses. A response is that defendants with greater bargaining power, as in Carnival, will prepare forum-selection
clauses to route litigation to states with law more favorable to defendants. The paradigm of unequal bargaining power in this context is not universal, of course (see The
Bremen and Stewart), and it is not clear how many clauses typically fall into one category as opposed to the other.
At any rate, permitting individuals to waive the option to forum shop, a waiver
process policed by the courts, see infra Part II.C., is apt to have some positive and
negative externalities. The difficulties in sorting out the competing concerns suggests that forum shopping is more personal than structural, and thus is waivable.
120. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
122. For federal question cases brought in state court, The Bremen federal common
law rule would undoubtedly preempt a contrary state rule, at least if the state law
were held to frustrate the objectives of the federal rule. See Howlett v. Rose, I10 S.
Ct. 2430, 2443 (1990). Similarly, the federal common law rule may have enough
preemptive force to govern in all cases brought in state court. Freer, supra note 83, at
1130-31 n.206.
These conclusions seem to flow from the initial assumption that there should be a
federal common law rule, embodying The Bremen-an assumption I question below.
But even if this assumption is correct, it does not necessarily follow that this common
law rule would govern even in state court, or at least non-federal question state court
cases. The contrary state rule would have to frustrate the purpose of The Bremen's
solicitude toward forum-selection clauses. Merely because the rules differ-and
might result in different outcomes--does not, in itself, demonstrate such frustration.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 468 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). Rather, the inconsistency
between federal and state interests must flow from perceived inhospitability to federal interests or discrimination against parties seeking to enforce federally-secured
rights. Michael E. Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretationof Settlements of Federal Civil
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Most lower courts that have addressed these issues have held that
The Bremen analysis embodies a federal common law rule that operates
outside the admiralty context, and applies to both diversity and federal
question cases. 1 23 Both conclusions are incorrect.
1. Diversity Cases
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Stewart 124 provides the starting
point for determining whether federal or state law governs the validity
of a forum-selection clause in a diversity case. As outlined above, Justice
Scalia rejected the majority's position that the federal transfer statute
governed the case. 1 25 Given that conclusion, the appropriate analysis
under the Rules of Decision Act12 6 asks whether the application of a
judge-made federal rule (such as The Bremen) would encourage forum
shopping or lead to the inequitable administration of the laws. Justice
Scalia concluded that both results would follow, thus mandating that
state law govern forum-selection clauses.
Justice Scalia's analysis seems sound. Clearly, a litigant seeking
either to enforce or to avoid a forum-selection clause will shop for a
forum that either enforces or does not enforce such clauses. Moreover,
applying federal law can discriminate against a non-resident defendant
who cannot remove 12 7 a case to federal court. It is not surprising that
Rights Actions, 19 RUTrGERS LJ. 295, 330-31 (1988). A generalized federal interest in
enforcing forum-selection clauses-as policed by the criteria of The Bremen and Carnival tests-would seem to clash with a per se rule holding all such clauses invalid (e.g.,
as in Alabama, supra note 84). On the other hand, a state rule which embodies a
rebuttable presumption against such clauses, as seems to be the case in Iowa and New
York, see supra notes 84-85, does not seem enough of a fundamental clash with federal
interests to justify entirely preempting those state rules.
Despite the generally accepted view that there is a federal common law rule in
favor of forum-selection clauses, see infra note 123, no state court opinion appears to
have addressed the argument that its own rule-whatever it may be-is entirely preempted by federal law.
123. See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148, 156 (2d
Cir. 1984) (federal securities laws); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of America, Inc.,
683 F.2d 718, 720-21 (2d Cir. 1982) (federal antitrust laws);Jones v. Weibrecht, 901
F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (diversity, federal question); Manetti-Farrow,
Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (diversity); Mercury
Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315, 317-18 (4th
Cir. 1982) (diversity); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1068 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (en banc) (diversity), aff'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
But see General Eng. Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57
(3d Cir. 1986) (diversity, state law controls); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916-19 (11 th Cir. 1989) (same). Cf. Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting split in diversity
cases but finding it unnecessary to resolve issue).
124. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting). See supra Part I.B.
125. It is difficult to argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)-governing motions to dismiss for lack of venue-covers the issue of whether forumselection clauses are enforceable. Stein, supra note 83, at 1980 n.220; de By, supra
note 83, at 1075-76. Cf. Mullenix, supra note 25, at 327-29.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988).
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commentators generally support Scalia's position.' 28
Justice Harlan's Rules of Decision Act analysis leads to the same
result.' 29 If the state rule "substantially affect[s] those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulation,"'13 0 then state law should apply. Ex ante consideration of a difference between federal and state law on choice-of-forum
clauses may well affect commercial decisions to enter certain geographic
markets. The uncertainty is exacerbated by potential litigants' lack of
knowledge of the forum where the battle will take place. t3 Concern
over forum-selection clauses is thus a "primary decision" by prospective
litigants, and state law governing that concern ought to be applied in
diversity actions in federal court.
2.

FederalQuestion Cases

Because federal question cases are predicated on statutes that are silent
on the issue of choice-of-forum clauses, courts must resort to federal
common law to fill the gap. 13 2 Principles for the creation of federal
128. E.g., Freer, supra note 83, at 1140; Lederman, supra note 5, at 452-55; Mullenix, supra note 25, at 338; de By, supra note 83, at 1080-81. See also Earl M. Maltz,
Choice ofForum and Choice of Law in the FederalCourts: A Reconsideration of Erie Principles,
79 Ky. LJ.231, 251-52 (1990-91) (arguing that Erie principles should inform application of § 1404(a) in this context, particularly given opportunity for forum shopping).
Some might argue that this analysis undervalues federal interests at stake. Such an
argument might draw on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
a Rules of Decision Act case that employed a balancing of state and federal interests.
See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OFJUDI-

CIAL POWER 219-25 (2d ed. 1990) (arguing for continued use of Byrd-type balancing
in Rules of Decision Act cases); Stein, supra note 83, at 1966-67 (advancing argument
in context of forum-selection clauses); Freer, supra note 83, at 1140-41 (positing but
rejecting this argument). Indeed, it is just this sort of argument that appears to
account for some of the cases on the impressive list which applies federal law in
diversity cases. See supra note 123. E.g., Manetti-Farrow,858 F.2d at 512.
This argument, however, faces several significant barriers. Doctrinally, Byrd, while
never expressly overruled, is moribund. It went unmentioned in all the opinions in
Stewart, and in the Court's more recent Rules of Decision Act jurisprudence. See
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2136-38 (1991). The argument fails to
recognize that Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), as reconfirmed by dicta in the
Stewart majority opinion, departed from the Byrd balancing test. De By, supra note 83,
at 1077-78.
At any rate, a federalism approach does not necessarily mean that state law should
be discarded in this context. There are significant regulatory interests served by a
state law that does not enforce choice-of-forum clauses-such as the interest in regulating conduct by defendants-which are worthy of deference by a federal diversity
court. See Stein, supra note 83, at 1975-76. See also Freer, supra note 83, at 1138-40 &
n.241 (arguing federal interest is slight or nonexistent in this regard).
129. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 475. The Harlan test has been invoked by the Court in other contexts.
E.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., I llS. Ct. 1711, 1716 (1991) (applying "substantive rights" proviso of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988)).
131. Stein, supra note 83, at 1951; de By, supra note 83, at 1081-82.
132. Two federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) and the aforementioned Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988), might be thought to command application
of state law in these circumstances. Section 1988, enacted as a companion provision
to the civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era, provides that where federal law
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common law are relatively well-settled. As the Court reiterated last
Term, "the interstices of federal remedial schemes [should be filled]
with uniform federal rules only when the scheme in question evidences a
distinct need for nationwide legal standards," 13 3 and state law should
ordinarily be incorporated as the federal rule of decision unless state law
"would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs."' 134 The
latter presumption is especially strong "in areas in which private parties
have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights
35
and obligations would be governed by state-law standards."'
The application of these standards demonstrates that a federal common law favoring forum-selection clauses need not be created for federal question cases (other than admiralty cases governed by The Bremen
and Carnival) or, if it is, state law should be incorporated as the rule of
decision. At the outset, it is useful to restate the parameters of the
debate. Federal common law, as reflected in The Bremen and Carnival,
favors the enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses, and almost all the
states follow this view. A handful of states either hold such clauses
unenforceable per se or seem to apply a presumption against their validity. Plaintiffs filing federal question cases can, by design or accident,
find themselves either in federal or state court. Should federal law govern the validity of their claims as well?
It is difficult to see how application of state law in these circumstances would violate specific federal interests. The mere existence of
the federal statute creating a private cause of action should not be considered, by itself, a sufficient reason. 136 Rather, the purpose of the federal law should be examined. On that score, most federal statutes
empowering private plaintiffs to bring suit probably employ some mixture of remedial and deterrence rationales. 13 7 To give full force to
these objectives, we presumably should give plaintiffs the opportunity to
forum shop, to enable them to choose the most favorable and conveis "deficient" state law will govern to the extent that it "is not inconsistent" with

federal law. The Rules of Decision Act states that: "The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in
the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
While not unanimous, see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy,
and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989),

the prevailing view is that neither statute inhibits appropriate creation of federal
common law. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805
(1989); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 883, 903-05 (1986); Solimine, supra note 122, at 322 (citing other authorities).
133. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., Ill S.Ct. 1711, 1717 (1991).
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
135. Id. See generally Solimine, supra note 122, at 323.
136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 63537 (1985). See also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); REDISH, supra note 128, at 125.
137. E.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 n.4 (1983) (describing compensation and deterrence functions of civil rights statutes); Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 635-36
(same with respect to antitrust laws).
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nient court.13 8 Ironically, to the extent forum-selection clauses reduce
the opportunity to forum shop, enforcement of a clause undercuts this
federal interest. 139
Determining whether state law would undermine or be inconsistent
with federal interests is also informed by the law's novelty, whether it
unjustifiably burdens a plaintiff pursuing federally secured rights, or
whether it discriminates against such plaintiffs. 140 Application of these
factors does not lead to the conclusion that state law disfavoring choiceof-forum clauses is inconsistent with federal interests. State law
rejecting The Bremen test is relatively rare, but hardly aberrant. It stems
from a long-standing practice only recently abandoned by federal and
other state courts, and it is not devoid of logical underpinnings. The
"ouster" theory is anachronistic, but a state may wish to exercise its legislative jurisdiction (over a case otherwise within its judicial jurisdiction)
to regulate conduct of defendants, to benefit residents, or to enforce a
policy against adhesion contracts. 141 Similarly, refusing to enforce such
clauses across the board can hardly be said to discriminate against federal plaintiffs, or (for the reasons given above) hinder the exercise of
42
federal rights.'
The other prong of federal common lawmaking focuses on the need
for nationwide, uniform standards. That current state law regarding
choice-of-forum clauses is not unanimous does not necessarily establish
the need for uniformity.14 3 Rather, there must exist a danger of interstate spillovers, that is, of states burdening non-residents or of dis138. See Chemerinsky, supra note 118, at 306; Richard B. Saphire &Susan W. Brenner, The Effect of the Ohio Court of Claims Act on Civil Rights Actions in State and Federal
Courts, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 167, 168-69 (1991); Susan E. Powley, Note, Exploring a
Second Level of Parity: Suggestionsfor Developing an Analytical Frameworkfor Forum Selection
in Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 44 VAND. L. REv. 641 (1991).
Forum shopping is usually conceptualized as being among the fifty states, or
between federal and state courts. It is rarely thought of as being between federal
courts in different jurisdictions, perhaps because (at least in federal question cases)
these courts are thought to be applying a uniform body of law. While nominally true,
geographic differences in the resolution of federal claims undoubtedly exist and this
can drive forum shopping in federal question cases. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and PrisonerCases, 77 GEO. LJ. 1567, 158494 (1989); Charles R. Epp, ConnectingLitigation Levels and Legal Mobilization: Explaining
Interstate Variation in Employment Civil Rights Litigation, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 145
(1990); Peter Siegelman, Another Look at Employment Discrimination Litigation: A
Reply to Epp (ABF Working Paper #9005) (on file with author).
139. See Stein, supra note 83, at 2005; Red Bull Assocs. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc.,
862 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1988). Red Bull specifically concerned a transfer motion
under § 1404(a), but its logic seems to apply with full force outside the confines of a
transfer motion. The case is critically discussed infra, Part III.B.
140. Solimine, supra note 122, at 332-33.
141. Freer, supra note 83, at 1136-1139; Stein, supra note 83, at 1971-85.
142. One can posit situations where the plaintiff, seeking to enforce a federal right,
wishes to enforce a forum-selection clause. Putting aside the fact that this circumstance seems practically nonexistent in the case law, the presence of such scenarios
does not detract from the wishes of a similarly situated plaintiff to avoid such clauses.
143. For example, in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711
(1991), the Court refused to fashion a federal common law to govern the demand
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rupting interstate commerce or other relationships. This view of
uniformity has been advanced by commentators 144 and increasingly
45
accepted by the Court, as well.1
Two examples drawn from contract law will illustrate this point.
The Court, in justifying the creation of a federal common law to govern
collective bargaining agreements, has emphasized the difficulties of subjecting such agreements to varying state law interpretations. 146 Since
many unions and employers have offices in more than one state, differing interpretations of union contracts could affect interstate commerce. 14 7 On the other hand, some lower courts have held that disputes
over the interpretation of settlements of federal civil rights actions
should be controlled by state law, 148 a result justifiable since most such
149
disputes involve few if any interstate spillovers.
At first blush, application of an interstate externality approach to
forum-selection clauses seems to demand uniformity. By definition,
most clauses involve parties and courts from more than one state.
Whether or not such clauses are enforced, they implicate interstate
interests. In Carnival, for example, a Washington plaintiff is unable to
litigate her claim against a Florida defendant in Washington courts, and
must do so in Florida. A state declining to enforce such a clause
deprives another state court system of a case, and burdens a defendant
who may be a non-resident. 150
Although this scenario demonstrates lack of uniformity, it does not
necessarily compel creation of federal common law. To be sure, those
states that refuse to enforce choice-of-forum clauses may not be acting
requirement in shareholder derivative litigation based on federal law, despite the fact
that state law widely differs on the question. Id. at 1719.
144. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 75-76 (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM 183-84 (1985); Solimine, supra note 122, at 326-27.
145. E.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773,
2779 (1991) (in determining whether federal common law should supply uniform
statute of limitations for securities claims, court "should accord particular weight to

the geographic character of the claim.. ."); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) ("multistate nature of [the federal cause of

action] indicates the desirability of a uniform federal statute of limitations.").
146. International Bhd. Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 856-57 (1987);
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
147. Solimine, supra note 122, at 328.

148. There is a split of authority on this issue. Compare Fulgence v.J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (federal law controls) with
Dhaliwal v. Woods Div., Hesston Corp., 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir.) (state law con-

trols), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 194 (1991). For a lengthier list of cases on point, see
Solimine, supra note 122, at 319 & n.120.
149. Solimine, supra note 122, at 326-28. See also Agency Holding Corp. v. MalleyDuff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) ("the typical § 1983 suit . . . most
commonly involves a dispute wholly within one State.").
150. Similar considerations seem to follow if the clause directs litigation into foreign jurisdictions. See infra Part III.C.
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out of wholly altruistic motives. As suggested above,' 5 ' such states may
be primarily interested in generating business for state lawyers and protecting state residents, perhaps at the expense of non-residents. A uniform law might be appropriate if these were the only motivations or the
principal results of the case law of the states that refuse to enforse the
clauses. But the jurisprudence of these states does not support this conclusion. All purport to apply their doctrine evenhandedly. Refusing to
enforce such clauses can work to the benefit of a resident (if that person
is seeking to avoid the effect of the clause) or of a non-resident (if that
15 2
person, too, is attempting to avoid the clause).
Nevertheless, a less sanguine observer might suspect that the states
refusing to enforce choice-of-forum clauses are largely or exclusively
driven to help residents at the expense of non-residents. Presumably,
under this explanation this situation existed in all the states, decades
ago, when the uniform rule was to hold such clauses invalid. If these
assumptions are true, it would make little sense for state A to enforce
such clauses, sending one of its residents to the courts of state B, when
state B will not reciprocate and enforce a clause and require its residents
to litigate in state A. The fifty states would seem to have been caught in
15 3
a prisoner's dilemma.
Yet in reality this has not occurred. As we have seen, the states have
gradually abandoned the old rule in the latter part of this century; only a
handful of states declare forum-selection clauses invalid per se. This
evolution seems to be a textbook example of reciprocity.' 54 States
151. See supra -note 141 and accompanying text. These motivations (as well as
others) undoubtedly underlie choice-of-forum statutes, as well. See infra Part III.A.
In analyzing the reasons that might motivate states to refuse to enforce forumselection clauses, Professor Stein has called for an examination of the law in each such
state. Stein, supra note 83, at 1982. The reason, according to him, is that certain
rationales-such as reliance on the "ouster" theory-are not entitled to deference by
a federal court, while other, regulatory rationales are. Id. The problem with the
state-by-state approach, as Stein recognizes, id. at 1975, is that the purported rationale(s) are next to impossible to cull from the published cases. See supra notes 85-86
and accompanying text. Thus, the better approach is to focus on the likely rationales
and effects of the state rule, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function and the
Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REv. 1063, 1079-80 (1979); Solimine,
supra note 119, at 66, as a presumptive rule, and permit litigants to bring to a court's
attention what might be the "actual" rationale or effects.
152. It is also possible that neither party would be a resident, or that both are
residents.
153. The classic prisoner's dilemma concerns two prisoners who cannot communicate with each other. Each can be silent (cooperate) or inform on the other. If one
informs and the other does not, then the first goes free while the other receives a
long jail term. If both inform, each will get a moderately long jail term, and if both
remain silent, then each will get a shorter term. Thus, each has an incentive to
inform, even though they would both be better off if they remained silent. BRILMAYER,
supra note 116, at 156. For an application of the prisoner's dilemma paradigm to
choice-of-law issues, see id. at 156-58; Kramer, supra note 116, at 341-42; Louise
Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. L.J. 53, 55-58 (1991).
154. There are two types of reciprocity-specific and diffuse. Under the former,
benefits are extended with the understanding that other benefits will be extended in
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escape the prisoner's dilemma by taking a chance on cooperation, by
enforcing a clause and sending a resident to litigate in another state.
The state hopes that the other state will do likewise when faced with the
other side of the coin. If the second state refuses to cooperate (or
reneges on an initial cooperative decision), then the first can change its
mind and go back to the old approach.' 5 5 Eventually, by successively
56
playing these games, all the states will begin to cooperate.1
In the context of interstate judging, this game may seem artificial,
since judges do not, literally, cooperate. But they do informally and
indirectly communicate through published case decisions, 15 7 which,
viewed through the lens of stare decisis, are relatively reliable predictors
of future behavior by that state. Eventually, game theory predicts that
all fifty states will have a uniform rule, 15s a process that seems to be
underway.
The upshot of game-theory analysis is that those few states that
adhere to the old rule seem not to be driven exclusively, or even primarily, by interstate externality concerns. Thus, it is unnecessary to create
federal common law to cover forum-selection clauses if such common
law is primarily devoted to cleansing interstate litigation of spillovers
that burden non-residents.
A final factor suggesting that the creation of federal common law is
inappropriate is the Court's admonition that care should be taken when
preempting areas of primary conduct traditionally regulated by the
states.i 59 Contract law is one of these areas, 160 and the writing of
return. Under the latter, there are no bilateral deals, but merely the general understanding in a group that cooperation can succeed. BRILMAYER, supra note 116, at 162.
The reciprocity presented here is of the latter type.
155. Kramer, supra note 116, at 342-43. Compare Weinberg, supra note 153, at 5657 (less sanguine about success of comity under these circumstances).
156. In effect, each state executes a reciprocal forum-selection clause with another
state. For a rare example, see Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 491, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374, 551 P.2d 1206 (1976) (California agent agreed to
litigate in Pennsylvania, while the Pennsylvania principal agreed to litigate in California). See also Stern, supra note 7, at 20 (discussing possibility of such clauses).
157. BRILMAYER, supra note 116, at 159; G. ALAN TARR & MARY C. PORTER, STATE
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 30-34 (1988); Gregory A. Caldeira, Legal Pre-

cedent: Structures of Communication Between State Supreme Courts, 10 Soc.

NETWORKS

29

(1988); Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmissionof Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme
Courts, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 178 (1985).
158. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1023-28 (1991).

Adoption of uniform acts by legislatures is often given as an example of cooperation. See BRILMAYER, supra note 116, at 161-62; Kramer, supra note 116, at 344. On
the other hand, legislative uniformity does not necessarily indicate cooperation. For
example, it has been argued that adoption of long-arm statutes, most of which extend
to the limits of due process, see David S. Welkowitz, Going to the Limits of Due Process:
Myth, Mystery and Meaning, 28 DUQUESNE L. REV. 233 (1990), is meant to make it
easier for residents to sue out-of-state defendants. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110
S. Ct. 2105, 2125-26 n.14 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); Stein, supra note 83, at
2004. See also United Rope Distrib., Inc. v. Seatriumph Marine Corp., 930 F.2d 532,
535-36 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook,J.) (arguing for adoption of federal common law
of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases).
159. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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agreements containing forum-selection clauses falls easily within its
domain. To the extent that party expectations are relevant, it would
seem that most drafters of such clauses would think that state law would
16 1
of the clause. 16 2
apply to govern the validity
C.

Developing and Applying Rules to Determine a Valid Waiver

Whether state or federal law governs the validity and interpretation of a
forum-selection clause, the question of what standards should inform
the judicial inquiry into whether a particular clause should be upheld
remains.
1. A Spectrum of Rules and the Relevance of Choice-of-Law Clauses
The Bremen and Carnival appear to establish a general "reasonableness" 1 63 test to govern the enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses. As
addressed above,164 the reasonableness inquiry is based heavily on normal contractual principles. Courts are to determine whether the contract, or the clause contained therein,' 65 was the product of undue
influence or overwhelming bargaining power, and to consider whether
the chosen forum was so seriously inconvenient that it, in effect,
afforded no remedy at all. Carnival did not purport to modify this
approach. Rather, it "refined" the analysis to take into account "the
160. E.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (third-party beneficiary
action upon a federal contract); United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979)
(federal liens not directly involving federal interests).
161. Even if it were concluded that federal common law should govern the validity
or enforceability of such clauses, it might be argued as a compromise that state law
could govern the interpretationof the clause. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan,
916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990) (raising this as a possibility but not resolving

issue). Cf. Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 816 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1987) (federal law governs validity, but state law governs authority to enter into settlement);
Morgan v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1986) (same). The
attractiveness of this position is that the per se validity (or lack thereof) of such
clauses is the aspect most deserving of federal interest. The drawback to the argument is that, unless one body of law governs all of these issues, confusion and uncertainty will follow. It seems preferable to reject this bifurcated approach. See
Solimine, supra note 122, at 330 (making similar argument with respect to law governing settlement of federal civil rights actions). See also BORN & WESTIN, supra note
5, at 173-76 (summarizing typical issues of interpretation).
162. Permitting state law to govern choice-of-forum clauses has the additional
advantage of maintaining symmetry with the law governing choice-of-law clauses,
typically state law. E.g., Freer, supra note 83, at 1135 & n.226; Stein, supra note 83, at
1982 & n.223. For the reasons outlined above, there seems little justification for
creating a federal common law to govern choice-of-law clauses.
163. This is how Carnival characterized the analysis in The Bremen. 111 S. Ct. at
1526.
164. Supra Part I.A.
165. Courts do not always make the distinction, but apparently the Court meant
that the inclusion of the clause itself, not the contract as a whole, should be the subject of scrutiny. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974); Moses
v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1138 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
81 (1991).
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realities of form passage contracts." 166 It did not claim to add or
detract elements from The Bremen test. Indeed, Carnival seems to lay to
rest the notion that The Bremen authorized a free-wheeling balancing-ofinterests test to govern the enforceability of choice-of-forum clauses.' 6 7
Nonetheless, Carnival leaves unanswered two significant issues left
open by The Bremen. A doctrinal question remains concerning the relevance, if any, of a choice-of-law clause to determining the validity of a
forum-selection clause. A normative question is whether the contractual
basis of the waiver of rights permitted in Carnival and The Bremen is an
adequate standard.
Apparently, many forum-selection clauses are routinely coupled
with choice-of-law clauses, usually selecting the law of the chosen
forum.1 68 Such clauses raise two issues: (1) should the law chosen govern the validity of the forum-selection clause?16 9 and (2) should the law
chosen be a relevant factor in determining the validity of the clause? The
first issue seems fairly easy to resolve. Most authorities hold that parties
cannot choose the law with respect to certain matters outside their control, such as capacity, formalities or validity. 170 Thus, a contractual provision stating "there is consideration," or directing a choice of law to
that issue, is unenforceable. It seems to follow that the issue of the
validity of a choice-of-forum clause is to be determined by forum law,
notwithstanding the law referred to in a choice-of-law clause. 17 1
1527.
167. For an excellent review of the post-Bremen lower court cases which address the
166. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at

validity of such clauses, see Mullenix, supra note 25, at 356-60. As Mullenix observes,
id. at 357, the "expansion of The Bremen elements reached its apotheosis" in
D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983), which held the
following factors (among others) to be relevant:
(1) The identity of the law which governs construction of the contract.
(2) The place of execution of the contract(s).
(3) The place where the transactions have been or are to be performed.
(4) The availability of remedies in the designated forum.
(5) The public policy of the initial forum state.
(6) The location of the parties, the convenience of prospective witnesses,
and the accessibility of evidence.
(7) The relative bargaining power of the parties and the circumstances surrounding their dealings.
(8) The presence or absence of fraud, undue influence or other extenuating (or exacerbating) circumstances.

(9) The conduct of the parties.
Mullenix, supra note 25, at 358 (footnotes omitted) (quoting factors listed in
D 'Antuono, 570 F. Supp. at 712). Only factors (5), (6) and (7) and part of (8) seem to
be drawn from The Bremen opinion.
168. SEDLER, supra note 7, at 71-72; Gruson, supra note 10, at 191 n.241; Freer,
supra note 83, at 1135.
169. See Mullenix, supra note 25, at 300-01, 348-50 (raising issue and noting lack of
resolution in lower courts).
170. WEINTRAUB, supra note 87, at 371-74; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 187(l)-(2) & cmts. c & d (1988).
171. See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d
Cir. 1982). Cf. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476
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The second issue-the relevance of a choice-of-law clause to the
reasonableness inquiry-is more complex. Two schools of thought
appear to have emerged. Under one view, the law chosen is relevant to
the inquiry. If the law chosen differs substantially from the law of the
forum state asked to enforce the clause in derogation, then that is a factor suggesting unreasonableness. 17 2 The other view disengages the two
clauses and finds the law chosen irrelevant to the validity of a choice-of173
forum clause.
The latter view seems preferable. It appears permissible for the
parties to contract out of the protection of forum law by referring to the
law of another state. This exercise of party autonomy is subject to a
number of strictures, including that there be adequate consent and that
the chosen state have some reasonable relationship to the parties or
their dispute.' 74 Regardless of whether those conditions are satisfied,
however, it seems unnecessary to consider the choice-of-law clause in
determining the validity of the forum-selection clause. To be sure, the
chosen state's law (if the clause is enforced) may evade the law of the
initial forum. But with adequate consent, the parties can decide to disclaim the protection or burden of forum law, the typical result when
parties settle out of court.' 75 And settlement is not forbidden for that
reason. Put another way, a change of forum should operate regardless
of whether the substantive law also changes by a choice-of-law clause or
(in its absence) by a normal conflict-of-laws principle. Any other course
would probably mean that forum-selection clauses would be enforced
less often. 176 In addition, under the view advocated here the forum
state's (the state that will give up jurisdiction) interest (if it has one) can
be accommodated by determining that the chosen forum offers an adequate remedy.
This brings us to the normative issue raised by The Bremen and Carnival-whether contractual consent adequately considers the rights
waived by a forum-selection clause. Forum-selection clauses typically
waive rights to forum shop and to contest personal jurisdiction. It can
be argued that waiver of these important rights, derived from constitutional due-process sources, should not be governed by normal contrac(1989) (parties, through choice-of-law clause in arbitration agreement, can direct that
state law, rather than Federal Arbitration Act, applies).
172. E.g., Gilbert, supra note 5, at 56. This appears to be the majority approach.
Mullenix, supra note 25, at 350-5 1. Cf. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. See also Lederman,
supra note 5, at 462-64 (discussing when law designated in a choice-of-law clause
should govern enforceability of forum-selection clause).
173. E.g., Gruson, supra note 10, at 190-91.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 187(1)-(2) (1988); Kramer,

supra note 116, at 329-30.
175. BRILMAYER & MARTIN, supra note 20, at 529;

DAVID H. VERNON ET AL., CON-

LAws 197-98 (1990).
176. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981) (giving same reason

FLICr OF

for why change in law should not be given great weight in forum non conveniens
determination).
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tual rules. 17 7 Pursuant to this argument, waiver, although permissible,
should only be predicated on the waiving party's explicit recognition of
the rights she is waiving. Such an inquiry would be informed by dueprocess principles rather than contractual ones. 178 Only some sort of
judicial hearing, or at least heightened judicial scrutiny of the choice-offorum clause, would appear to satisfy this standard.
The fear underlying this position seems to arise from the empirically correct observation that choice-of-forum clauses are seldom set
aside under the usual principles of contract law. 179 This fear will
undoubtedly be exacerbated by the outcome of Carnival. And there is
ample precedent for a higher degree of judicial scrutiny of waivers of
rights in certain situations.18 0 It does not follow from these factors,
however, that a higher standard of scrutiny is necessary to evaluate
forum-selection clauses.
First, as the advocates of a standard of greater scrutiny acknowledge, 18 ' the scope of necessary consent to a choice-of-forum clause
depends on the nature of the right waived and the protections encompassed by the right. Some rights are more important than others and
are therefore more deserving of a higher waiver standard. This accounts
for the higher standards demanded for waiver of rights in criminal proceedings, where life and liberty are at stake. In contrast, in many civil
proceedings, particularly those involving contractual disputes where the
parties have structured their own relationships, standards drawn from
contract law seem to be a natural source for the content of waiver. 18 2
While important, the rights waived by most forum-selection clauses
do not demand a higher degree of perfection than that already provided
177. Here I summarize the argument made by Mullenix, supra note 25, at 364-72.
178. Id. at 369, 372. This analysis can be linked to the debate between autonomybased notions of contract and fairness- or communitarian-based models. The latter
model, like that posited in the text, would more heavily emphasize disparities in
wealth and knowledge between the parties, the social context and evolving nature of
their relationship, and the possibility of establishing certain inalienable rights. See

Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 712-22 (1990).
179. Mullenix, supra note 25, at 362. See also BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 195

("Although unequal bargaining power is frequently argued, few courts have actually

found the exception applicable.") (citations omitted).
180. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of settlements of class
actions); Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 983
(1990) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (West Supp. 1991)) (requiring that, to
be valid, waivers of rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act must,
inter alia, specifically refer to rights waived, advise the individual waiving any right to
consult an attorney, and be written in a manner calculated to be understood);Judith
Resnik,Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 86 (giving other examples). See also
O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 361-62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 177 (1991) (noting two approaches courts, applying federal law, have applied
to test the validity of waivers of federal rights: a "totality of the circumstances" test
vs. ordinary principles of contract law).
181. Mullenix, supra note 25, at 371-72.
182. Rubin, supra note 95, at 512.
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by contract law. As indicated above,1 83 the rights involved, personal
jurisdiction protections and the ability to forum shop, are largely personal rights with relatively few structural attributes. While those rights
affect one's ability to pursue litigation, a cause of action is a property
interest,18 4 of somewhat less importance than the interests at stake in
criminal proceedings. A valid forum-selection clause should send a litigant to another forum, not obliterate the right to sue entirely.' 8 5 Moreover, the substantive law governing the merits of the dispute is
18 6
ultimately more important than the place of litigation.
The second reason a higher standard of review is unnecessary is
that current doctrine seems adequate to the task. That doctrine, as
reflected in The Bremen and Carnival, draws largely on contractual principles, which are appropriate given that choice-of-forum clauses, by definition, arise out of a contract. Contract law does not treat such clauses
exactly as it does any other contractual provision. Doctrines such as
fraud and unconscionability, if used "flexibly, realistically,"' 18 7 can prevent improper waiver of rights affected by such clauses. Moreover, current doctrine also focuses on whether the forum chosen is seriously
inconvenient for the parties, a consideration that is invoked particularly
if the chosen forum is foreign.' 8 8
In short, current doctrine can adequately police waivers of rights by
forum-selection clauses. This Article considers next whether that doctrine has in fact adequately operated in practice.
2. ReconsideringA Typology of Forum-Selection Clauses
A defender of current doctrine should reflect on how it has been applied
in actual litigation. This Article does not offer an empirical study but
focuses on three sets of cases that appear prominently in case law on
forum-selection clauses. They will be discussed in increasing order of
the difficulty they present for defenders of choice-of-forum clauses:
(1) clauses negotiated between two commercial enterprises; (2) clauses
in contracts between sophisticated individuals and companies;
(3) clauses contained in form contracts, between individuals and
companies.
183. Supra Part II.A.
184. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-33 (1982).
185. Rubin, supra note 95, at 558-59.
186. VERNON ET AL., supra note 175, at 176; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
GeneralJurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721, 776-77 (1988); Linda Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88 (1978). Cf. Mullenix, supra note

25, at 372 (arguing that choice-of-law clauses should be subject to greater scrutiny as
well); Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory forJudicialJurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 249, 266-67 (1991) (arguing that forum choice is

as important as choice of law).
187. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.). See also Solimine, supra note 122, at 329.
188. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 198-99.
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The first set of cases is exemplified by The Bremen, where the language of the choice-of-forum clause was the subject of negotiation
between two large companies. 18 9 Presumably, these parties can and do
consider the probability and costs of a dispute arising and the benefits,
or lack thereof, of pre-designating a forum. They are not able to argue
convincingly that the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient. For these
reasons, most choice-of-forum clauses in contracts between such parties
are enforced. 190
The second set of cases is slightly more troublesome. These cases
involve dealings between educated and experienced individuals and corporations. For example, in Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Donovan, 19 1 a clause designating Wisconsin (the location of the company) as
the forum 192 was enforced over the protests of the individual defendants, who were millionaires from Texas.' 9 3 Observing (consistent with
Carnival,decided a few months later) that mere inequality of bargaining
power does not invalidate the clause, 194 Judge Richard Posner pointed
out that the defendants were "wealthy tax-shelter investors" who had
incentives to read contractual papers (including, but of course not limited to, a choice-of-forum clause) that might subject them to great liability in case a certain loan defaulted. 19 5 For similar reasons, most such
sophisticated individuals do not succeed in arguing against enforcing
19 6
choice-of-forum clauses.
In Northwestern, Judge Posner acknowledged a "tension" between
his approach and the Ninth Circuit opinion in Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, but distinguished the latter because the "facts . . .were special."' 9 7 The clause in that case, he noted, was contained in a classic
form contract, which the Shutes did not even receive until the transaction was complete. "Perhaps no stretch" of the concepts of fraud and
unconscionability "was necessary," he mused, to justify the result of the
189. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 2-3 (describing contractual process).
190. E.g., Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989);
Paul Business Sys., Inc. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 397 S.E.2d 804 (Va. 1990); TAAG

Linhas Aereas de Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir.
1990). But see Weidner Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar al Faisal, 859
F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (not enforced due to unequal bargaining power between

parties).
191. 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990).

192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

374-75.
374.
377.
378.

196. E.g., Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgt. Serv. Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
1991) (employment agreement);Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (sale of stock agreement); Appell v. George Philip and Son, Ltd., 760 F.
Supp. 167 (D. Nev. 1991); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Fla.
1991). See also Freeze v. American Home Prod. Corp., 839 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1988)

(enforcing choice-of-law clause).
197. Northwestern, 916 F.2d at 376-77.
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Ninth Circuit. 198
The facts of Carnival present the most difficult scenario in which to
justify choice-of-forum clauses. The clause was contained in a standard
form contract with no mention of, much less bargaining over, the content of the clause. Moreover, nothing in the published opinions reveals
that the Shutes were sophisticated individuals who had incentives to
read or ask about such clauses, or who could easily litigate their claims
in Florida.
Nonetheless, the result reached was correct. The majority in Carnival argued that the forum-selection clause was reasonable, despite the
lack of bargaining. It observed that such clauses contained in standard
form contracts confer ex ante benefits to the litigants by providing certainty as to jurisdictional issues, and by conferring savings (spread out
among all such contracts) realized by the cruise line in limiting the
places where it can be sued. 199 These observations fit comfortably into
the considerable literature that analyzes and generally supports form
contracts. Form contracts reduce transaction costs 2 00 and do not prevent bargaining over other matters, such as price. 20 1 Moreover, parties
like the Shutes are not completely without bargaining leverage. For
example, numerous cruise passengers, assuming they were ex post
offended by the forum-selection clause, conceivably could publicize the
198. Id. Amusingly, in their briefing before the Supreme Court, attorneys for Carnival embraced Judge Posner's opinion in Northwestern, given his favorable comments
about forum-selection clauses contained in form contracts, id. at 377, but held at
arm's length his comment about their case, which they claimed "was made without
any analysis" of cases involving cruise tickets. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 10
n.7, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 1 I1 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) [hereinafter Reply
Brief]. The Court itself did not specifically focus on that case in reaching its decision.
See supra note 44.
199. 111 S. Ct. at 1527. Presumably, price elasticity studies in the relevant market
served might confirm or deny the Court's speculation on the latter point.
Likewise, such a calculus may not account for all of the costs. If Carnival did cause
personal injuries, and if a forum-selection clause prevents litigation, then uncompensated real costs (to the injured party) and social costs (to third parties) are realized
but go uncompensated. In these circumstances, we might ask which party is the
cheaper cost avoider. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 274-84 (1987). Undoubtedly, it would be Carnival. If so,
perhaps we should not enforce forum-selection clauses, or at least presume against
their enforcement in Carnival-like (as opposed to The Bremen-like) circumstances.
Such an analysis emphasizes the importance of deciding whether such clauses, in a
given instance, would indeed as a practical matter prevent litigation. See infra notes
207-10 and accompanying text.
200. POSNER, supra note 111, at 102; 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 480.
201. Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer andAcceptance: Game Theory and the Law
of Contract Formation, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 215, 273 (1990).
It is also worth noting that some writers argue that Americans are, in any case,
averse to the type of bargaining demanded by critics of form contracts. Ian Ayres,
FairDriving: Gender and Race Discriminationin Retail CarNegotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv.
817, 871 (1991); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 916 F.2d at 377. See also Jay Feinman, The
Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1306-08 (1990).
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20 2
matter and bring pressure to bear on the cruise lines.
Even if a general attack on standard form forum-selection clauses
does not succeed, individuals like the Shutes could still fall back on doctrines such as unconscionability or fraud. For example, the couple
received the tickets containing the clause in the mail, after finalizing the
transaction, but before boarding the vessel. 20 3 Had they been unable to
rescind after first having the opportunity to view the clause, then, arguably, the clause could be considered invalid. 20 4 Likewise, if they did not
have the tickets until they boarded the ship, then enforcement of the
clause would seem unreasonable. 20 5 In these situations, apparently not
presented in Carnival,it could be argued that the contract was not properly communicated to a party or that it contained a term that a reasonable person might not expect it to contain. 20 6 It would be different if
the consumers had signed or at least seen these documents at the time
of contracting.
The second part of the reasonableness inquiry in Carnival considered and rejected the Shutes' argument that Florida was a seriously
inconvenient forum. 20 7 This result is also correct. As the Court
observed, no evidence in the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs or
their potential witnesses would be inconvenienced, or that Florida
courts would be a hostile forum. 20 8 While individual litigants could
attempt to show inconvenience factually, it would be very difficult to succeed, since presumably parties or their local counsel could retain Florida
attorneys to take the case. 20 9 The incremental additional cost of litigating in Florida, as opposed to Washington, does not seem by itself

202. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.

REV. 373, 404-05 (1990) (consumers collectively and over time can impose a reputational sanction against a standard form contract); Katz, supra note 201, at 280-81. To
be sure, this sort of sanction will only benefit a future class of consumers, of whom
people like the Shutes may not be members-unless they travel on cruises on a regular basis.
203. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1524.
204. The majority in Carnival briefly mentioned this factor. Id. at 1528. Counsel
for the parties debated the point. Compare Brief for Respondents at 28, Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991) (arguing ticket contract provided
no refund for an unused ticket) with Reply Brief, supra note 198, at 9 n.6 (acknowledging that "ticket contract forbids refunds for unused tickets after a cruise, but the
brochure provided to prospective passengers makes clear that refunds are available
to passengers who cancel a reasonable period before the cruise . . . The Shutes
received the brochure.").
205. This was the situation presented with regard to several of the plaintiffs
involved in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 515, 518
(1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991) (remanded for further consideration in
light of Carnival).

206. Cf. 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 483 (discussing contractual terms not
part of offer as grounds for invalidation).
207. 111 S. Ct. at 1527-28.
208. Id. at 1528.
209. Presumably organizations like the Association of American Trial Attorneys
could facilitate such communication. See also Reid-Walen v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390,
1398-99 (8th Cir. 1991) (forum non conveniens case, noting importance of plaintiff's
ability to litigate in a foreign forum).
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enough to be deemed seriously inconvenient. 2 10

I.

The Future of Forum-Selection Clauses

The post-Carnival era will likely see more forum-selection clauses
inserted into contracts, and more, although not necessarily all, of those
clauses enforced. Nevertheless, at least three obstacles to this benign
view may render the post-Carnival climate less hospitable than it might
at first seem: (1) possible preemption by federal or state statutes,
(2) the effect of transfer or dismissal statutes or doctrines on the operation of forum election clauses, and (3) the effect of the designated
forum being outside the United States.
A.

Statutory Preemption

1.

FederalStatutes

Without question, Congress has the constitutional authority to enact
statutes limiting the validity of forum-selection clauses. 2 1 1 The problem
lies in determining whether Congress, in any particular statute, has done
so. Ordinary tools of statutory construction provide a useful starting
point 2 12 but deciding what the ordinary tools are is a matter of some
dispute in the Court. The recent trend has been to focus on the text of
the relevant statutory provision, 21 3 but other cases include additional
factors to be considered, such as the entire statutory scheme,21 4 the statute's legislative history,2 15 and the underlying purpose of the statute.
210. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 186, at 776; Perdue, supra note 108, at 554.
211. With regard to proceedings in federal court, Congress can rely on its "powers
under Article III as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause." Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) (citation omitted). With
regard to proceedings in state court, Congress could presumably rely on the Commerce Clause. It is doubtful that the Tenth Amendment would prove to be much of a
barrier to the exercise of the latter power. Cf. Stein, supra note 83, at 1943-44.
212. Congressional regulation of forum-selection clauses does not seem to be an
appropriate place to fashion any clear-statement rules, e.g., a canon of construction
requiring that Congress textually and explicitly state that forum-selection clauses are
the subject of the law. Such clear-statement rules should be supported by important
constitutional or public policy objectives. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1991). While, post-Carnival,there can be said to be
a federal policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses, that objective
arguably conflicts with the concurrent policy of providing liberal remedies to plaintiffs enforcing federal rights. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. In light
of this clash of interests, there is little firm basis for establishing an uncontroversial
or coherent clear-statement rule in this context.
213. E.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (1991).
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990
Sup. CT. REV.

231.

214. E.g., International Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S.
Ct. 1700, 1705 (1991).
215. E.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991).
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Last Term, for example, the Court considered a waiver-of-remedies
case pertinent to the issue at hand. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.21 6 the Court considered the argument that the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act rendered invalid an employment agreement that
contained a compulsory arbitration provision for ADEA-related claims.
To determine whether Congress intended to "preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies" for ADEA rights, the Court examined the "text of the
ADEA, its legislative history [and whether there was an] 'inherent con21 7
flict' between arbitration and the ADEA's underlying purposes.1
Using that test, the Court permitted the arbitration agreement to
stand-a result consistent with the " 'federal policy favoring

arbitration.'

",218

As noted above, the Court in Carnival similarly rejected the argument that the Limited Liability Act, 2 19 which invalidates contractual
clauses that "lessen" or "weaken" ship passengers' rights to sue,
affected forum-selection clauses. The Court observed that the plain language of the provision did not mention such clauses, and that the legislative history instead seemed to outlaw provisions that "limit the
shipowner's liability for negligence or... remove the issue of liability
from the scrutiny of any court" via an arbitration clause. 220 Nevertheless, the dissent noted that the lack of mention of choice-of-forum
clauses was not surprising given the general rule in effect when the Act
was passed, denying enforcement to such clauses. 22 1 Moreover, the dissent argued such clauses do "lessen" or "weaken" the Shutes' ability to
22 2
recover by denying them what they consider to be a favorable forum.
Thus, the dissent concluded, a "liberal reading" of the Act would cover
22 3
forum-selection clauses.
The Limited Liability Act would seem to be an ideal candidate for
the "liberal reading" favored by the Carnival dissent. Neither the text
nor the legislative history of the Act (passed over 50 years ago) mention
forum-selection clauses. This arguably gives interpreters somewhat
224
greater leeway in construing the provisions to meet modem needs.
Moreover, the Act does not seem to favor one small interest group at
the expense of the public (indeed, it seems to do the opposite), further
216. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
217. Id. at 1652 (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 227 (1987)).
218. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).

219. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988).
220. Carnival, 111 S. Ct. at 1528-29.
221. Id. at 1532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Id. The dissent also pointed out that analogous provisions of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-56 (1988), have been interpreted to make
such clauses void. 111 S. Ct. at 1532-33. See also Mullenix, supra note 25, at 345
n.282.
224. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987).

1992

Forum-Selection Clauses

support for a broad reading of the statute. 2 25
However, the majority opinion relied upon the text and legislative
history of the statute, and gave little if any attention to the "underlying
purposes" of the Act, one of the criteria mentioned in Gilmer.226 This
result reflects the reasoning of most of the Court's statutory jurisprudence. 2 27 Perhaps the Court is less willing broadly to interpret statutes
dealing with procedural or jurisdictional matters because such statutes
are often narrowly drawn. 228 Or perhaps the Court was sub silentio
invoking a presumption in favor of forum-selection clauses.
The Limited Liability Act is almost unique in that it speaks to the
protection of a potential plaintiff. Most federal jurisdictional or procedural statutes speak only indirectly in that regard. For example, most
statutes creating private causes of action simply generalize about where
suit may be brought. 22 9 It is doubtful that the mere existence of a private cause of action, in itself, limits the operation of a choice-of-forum
clause. 23 0 But what if a statute vests exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts? 23 ' Typically, the purpose of such exclusivity is to encourage

uniform application of law in one court system and to combat possible
bias or lack of expertise by state courts. 2 32 It seems reasonable to interpret such statutes as limiting enforcement of forum-selection clauses to
those that designate somefederal court. Most courts have followed this
225. In public-choice parlance, while the Act may have been the result (in part) of
pressure from rent-seeking interest groups, the benefits are distributed among many
ship passengers while the detriments are concentrated within the shipping industry.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 290 (1988). In such circumstances, a
court is arguably justified in "updating" the statute to reflect modern problems and
needs. Id. at 299. But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More IntensiveJudicial Review?, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 60 n.125 (1991) (questioning Eskridge on this

point).
226. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. Perhaps it is no coincidence
that Justices Stevens and Marshall dissented in Gilmer, as well. 111 S. Ct. at 1657-61
(Stevens & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
227. See generally Eskridge, supra note 213; William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Phillip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
228. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.

REV. 1007, 1085 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction,
and Civil Rights, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2, 16-17 (1988).

229. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), 22 (1988) (antitrust laws); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e17 (1988) (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act). Some statutes do not even mention

jurisdiction or venue, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), and one must fall back on the
general jurisdictional, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343 (1988), or venue statutes, e.g.,

28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (West Supp. 1991).
230. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
231. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (patent and copyright actions); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1988) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also Michael E. Solimine,
Rethinking Exclusive FederalJurisdiction, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1991) (giving

other examples).
232. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1990). See generally Solimine, supra

note 231, at 406-13 (critique of traditional reasons for exclusivity). Cf. Stein, supra
note 83, at 1967 n.161 (addressing exclusive jurisdiction in Erie context).
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23 4
position, 23 3 although it was passed over in Carnival.
Another possible source of federal limitation on forum-selection
clauses are venue statutes. The case often cited 23 5 for this proposition
is Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. 23 6 There, plaintiff brought suit
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) 23 7 in a forum different from that stipulated in an agreement he had executed with his
employer. The forum was, however, consistent with the venue prerogatives found in the FELA.238 The Court held the forum-selection clause
void under an FELA provision that invalidated "any contract" that
"enable[s] any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this Act. ....,,239 The Court held that the liberal venue provisions of the FELA, which permitted suit in either federal or state court
and prohibited removal amounted to a "substantial right" that could not
240
be waived.
Although one might read Boyd to stand for the broad proposition
that venue guidelines cannot be waived or, at the least, that choice-offorum clauses must mirror statutory venue options, 24 1 such a broad
reading seems incorrect. First, unlike many federal laws, the FELA contains an anti-waiver provision. This suggests that Congress intended to
grant special protection to FELA plaintiffs. Thus, venue statutes without anti-waiver provisions may be waived via an otherwise valid forumselection clause. 24 2 Second, the Boyd analysis seems to be in some tension with Carnival. In Carnival, the Limited Liability Act also contained
an anti-waiver provision, yet the Court held that since it did not mention
forum-selection clauses it did not invalidate such clauses. Similarly, it
might be reasoned that the FELA's anti-waiver provision makes no mention of such clauses, and such clauses do not remove "liability" but
merely channel litigation into a forum different from that permitted by
the FELA's venue rules. Perhaps the two cases can be reconciled by the

233. E.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir.

1982) (antitrust action, forum-selection clause designating "Dallas County, Texas" as
forum is stated to be federal district court which embraces Dallas County). See also
Stein, supra note 83, at 2005-06.
234. Carnivalfell under admiralty jurisdiction, which lies in the exclusive purview
of federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988). Nevertheless, the Court enforced

without comment a choice-of-forum clause that designated "a Court located in the
State of Florida, U.S.A." See supra note 38 for complete text of the clause.

235. E.g., Gilbert, supra note 5, at 42 n.230.
236. 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (per curiam).
237. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-56 (1988).
238. 45 U.S.C. § 56. See Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265.
239. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 55).

240. 338 U.S. at 266.
241. Gilbert, supra note 5, at 40-42.
242. See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718, 720-22

(2d Cir. 1982) (venue provisions of antitrust laws can be waived in a forum-selection
clause). See also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)

(arbitration of securities claims permitted in spite of provision of Securities Act of
1933 permitting plaintiff to "sue in any court of competent jurisdiction." 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1988)).
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strong policy of protecting unsophisticated workers which generally ani24 3
mates the FELA.
A third potential conflict between choice-of-forum clauses and fed244
eral statutes has arisen in the context of the federal removal statute.
A contract may designate a state court, or the court chosen by one party,
as the exclusive forum. Does such a clause waive the right to remove the
action to federal court? The case law does not forbid waiver, but
requires varying degrees of consent by the party seeking removal.
The cases are split on the degree of consent needed for valid waiver
of the right of removal. One line of authority is exemplified by In re
Delta America Re Insurance Co. 245 There, the Sixth Circuit held that when
a foreign sovereign exercises the removal option provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 24 6 any waiver must be "clear and
unequivocal. ' 24 7 A clause designating the forum as "any court of competent jurisdiction within the United States" did not meet this standard.2 48 The court emphasized the special protection bestowed by
Congress upon foreign defendants, 24 9 although the Sixth Circuit
applied the same standard in an earlier case not involving a foreign
2 50
defendant.
25 1
The Third Circuit opinion in Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., Ltd.
illustrates the other position on removal. In Foster, the court held that a
forum-selection clause, identical to the clause in Delta, did waive the
right to remove.2 52 Foster distinguished Delta on two bases: first, it said
25 3
Delta "was primarily driven by considerations peculiar to the FSIA,"
and second, it did not agree that waivers of the right to remove must be
"clear and unequivocal." 25 4 Rather, the court observed, removal stat243. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362 (1952)

(discussing purposes of FELA). But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111
S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991) ("Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a

sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the
employment context.")
244. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1446-47 (West Supp. 1991).
245. 900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Arim Ins. Co., 111 S.Ct.

233 (1990).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988). This provision was enacted as part of the FSIA.
Pub. L. 94-583, § 6, 90 Stat. 2898 (1976).

247. 900 F.2d at 892, 893.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 893-94. See also Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de
Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (choice of forum that simply puts
jurisdiction in either a state or federal court does not waive right of removal).
250. Regis Assoc. v. Rank Hotels (Management), Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir.
1990). See also Mullenix, supra note 25, at 344-46 (supporting restrictions on waiver
of removal statute).
251. 933 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 302 (1991).
252. Id. at 1216-17. See also id. at 1217 (citing several district court opinions hold-

ing the same).
253. Id. at 1217-18 n.15.
254. Id. at 1218 n.15.
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utes have long been construed strictly against the right of removal. 2 55
Moreover, given the presumptive enforceability of choice-of-forum
clauses as emphasized by The Bremen, it was appropriate to use ordinary
25 6
methods of contractual construction to interpret the clause.
The Third Circuit has the better argument. Absent compelling considerations, such as a defendant governed by the FSIA, a choice-offorum clause ought to be governed by ordinary rules of contract interpretation. The right to remove does not seem to possess the sort of
structural characteristics that would make it non-waivable, putting aside
the fact that the statute does not contain an "anti-waiver" provision.
However, the Sixth Circuit approach is salutary insofar as it adjusts the
level of consent necessary rather than taking the more drastic step of
invalidating any contractual provision that purports to waive the right to
remove.
2.

State Statutes

The rise of forum-selection clauses has been almost wholly a common law phenomenon. What little legislative activity there has been
does not seem to have been particularly significant. A Model Uniform
Choice of Forum Act, promulgated in 1968,257 presented criteria for
255. See Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enterprises, Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (2d Cir.
1991) ("In light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as
well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal
courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against
removability.").
256. Foster, 933 F.2d at 1218 n.15. See also City of Rose v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 931
F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir.) (critical of reasoning in Delta), cert. denied sub nom. Nutmeg Ins.
Co. v. City of Rose, 112 S. Ct. 301 (1991).
257. The Act is reprinted in Willis L. M. Reese, The Model Choice of Forum Act, 17
AM.J. COMP. L. 292, 292 (1969). It states, in part, as follows:
SECTION 2. [Action in This State by Agreement.]
(a) If the parties have agreed in writing that an action on a controversy
may be brought in this state and the agreement provides the only basis for
the exercise ofjurisdiction, a court of this state will entertain the action if
(1) the court has power under the law of this state to entertain the action;
(2) this state is a reasonably convenient place for the trial of the action;
(3) the agreement as to the place of the action was not obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable
means; and
(4) the defendant, if within the state, was served as required by law of this
state in the case of persons within the state or, if without the state, was
served either personally or by registered [or certified] mail directed to his
last known address.
(b) This section does not apply [to cognovit clauses] [to arbitration clauses
or] to the appointment of an agent for the service of process pursuant to
statute or court order.
SECTION 3. [Action in Another Place by Agreement.] If the parties have agreed
in writing that an action shall on a controversy be brought only in another
state and it is brought in a court of this state, the court will dismiss or stay the
action, as appropriate, unless
(I) the court is required by statute to entertain the action;
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enforcement similar to that found in The Bremen,2 58 and was adopted by
four states. 2 59 One other state has enacted a statute that directs
enforcement of such clauses in certain commercial matters. 260 On the
other side, two states have passed statutes that limit enforcement of such
clauses in certain consumer matters, 2 6 1 and one state (Montana) has
passed a law that has been interpreted by the courts of that state to void
2 62
choice-of-forum clauses.
Despite the apparent use and importance of forum-selection
clauses, several reasons may explain why there has not been more legislative activity regarding such clauses. Historically, state legislatures
have given remarkably little attention to conflict of laws matters when
drafting legislation. 263 Development in case law may have overtaken the
need for such laws-especially as perceived by the local bar, who would
(2) the plaintiff cannot secure effective relief in the other state, for reasons
other than delay in bringing the action;
(3) the other state would be a substantially less convenient place for the trial
of the action than this state;
(4) the agreement as to the place of the action was obtained by misrepresentation, duress, the abuse of economic power, or other unconscionable
means; or
(5) it would for some other reason be unfair or unreasonable to enforce the
agreement.
258. The Bremen referred to the Model Act with approval. 407 U.S. 1, 11 n.13

(1972).
259. The four states are Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North Dakota.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAWS 951, 1020 (1974). The Act was withdrawn in 1975, due to its few adoptions.
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws 142 (1975).
260. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (Consol. Supp. 1990) (promulgated 1984). A
very similar law was recently enacted in Ohio. Am. Sub. H.B. 221, 119th Ohio Gen.
Assem. (1991) (to be codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.39).
261. CAL. COM. CODE § 10106 (West Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2A-106
(1990). See also UNIFORM FRANCHISE AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 509, 7A
U.L.A. 105 (1991 Supp.) (invalidating choice-of-forum clauses in franchise litigation),
(promulgated 1977); Gruson, supra note 10, at 178-79 & n. 199 (giving examples of
state franchise laws rendering forum-selection clauses invalid). But see Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738-40 (8th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (enforcing choice-of-law clause which opted out of state franchise law
which contained an anti-waiver provision); Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing Co., 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987) (same).
262. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1990). The provision states as follows:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is
restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may
thus enforce his rights is void. This section does not affect the validity of an
agreement enforceable under Title 27, chapter 5 [referring to arbitration
clauses].
In State ex rel. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1985), the
court interpreted this provision to invalidate a clause designating another state as the
forum. This result surely does not inexorably follow, given the lack of mention of
such clauses in the statute, as well as the reference to "the usual proceedings in the
ordinary tribunals," which could refer to courts in other states. Contrast Carnival's
interpretation of the Limited Liability Act.

263. Kramer, supra note 116, at 293.
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likely benefit the most from the added business and would also be in a
position to influence the legislature. 264 Relatedly, legislators who are
also lawyers may have been schooled in the old way of thinking about
forum-selection clauses and may not be disposed to enact laws challenging the "ouster" theory. Perhaps it is surprising that there has not been
a legislative response in the few states that do not enforce choice-offorum clauses.
One potentially rich source of state interference with forum-selection clauses was suggested by the Florida Supreme Court in C.R. McRae
v. J.D./M.D., Inc.265 There, the court, while generally upholding the
validity of such clauses, nevertheless held that a forum-selection clause
cannot be the sole basis for exercising jurisdiction over an objecting
non-resident defendant. 26 6 Rather, the defendant must also have committed acts that fall under the purview of the long-arm statute and
2 67
thereby must have some minimum contacts with the forum state.
The court observed that "[c]onspicuously absent from the long-arm
statute is any provision for submission to in personam jurisdiction
'268
merely by contractual agreement.
Such a provision seems to be similarly absent from every other
state's long-arm statute. However, the Florida Supreme Court reached
the incorrect result. Essentially, the court seems to disagree with the
accepted view that a properly drafted forum-selection clause also waives
any personal jurisdiction barriers. 269 The court's position is difficult to
reconcile with its professed solicitude toward forum-selection clauses. It
also reads too much into a long-arm statute, which, as the court
acknowledged, is silent on the matter. Perhaps the court was concerned
that it would have to accept cases involving at least one party with no
state contacts, 270 and thus unlikely to implicate the regulatory interest
of Florida. Such a concern, however, can be accommodated by
accepting the case, but then considering a transfer to another state, or
outright dismissal-the subject of the next section.
B.

Transfer and Dismissal after Derogation and Prorogation

Most of the published case law concerns derogation-whether or not to
abstain in the matter because a forum-selection clause designates
another jurisdiction as the forum. 27 1 If the first court agrees to derogate, it may either dismiss the action or transfer it (if that route is available) to the designated forum. Similarly, when the second court
264. For an analogous discussion of the passage of corporate law, see Jonathan R.

Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw,
65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
265. 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987).
266. Id. at 544.
267. Id. at 543.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
270. The plaintiff in the case had contacts with Florida. 511 So. 2d at 543.
271.

Gilbert, supra note 5, at 19.
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receives the action in prorogation, it may wish, for a variety of reasons,
to transfer it, or dismiss it on forum non conveniens grounds.
The principal route of transfer among federal courts is § 1404(a),
considered in the Stewart case. 2 72 As the Court observed, 273 the language and case law of § 1404(a) requires a case-by-case determination
of whether another forum will be more convenient to the parties and to
the witnesses. 2 74 Section 1404(a) only permits transfer among federal
district courts, and no authority currently permits transfer between federal and state courts, or between state courts. 2 75 In those instances, the
first state must dismiss and suit must be refiled in the second state.
Forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine permitting a court to
dismiss an action in favor of another, more convenient forum. Typically, in determining the propriety of such a dismissal, a court will consider both "private" and "public" interests. 27 6 Initially, the court
should consider whether there is an alternative forum with an adequate
remedy.2 77 If there is, then the court should consider private interests,
including relative ease of access to sources of proof, ability to join other
parties, and other practical problems.2 78 Matters of public interest for a
court to consider include the merits of having a forum apply its own law,
whether it would be unfair to burden a judge and jury in a forum with
little connection to the controversy, and the interests of the respective
2 79
fora in the outcome of the case.
Arguably, a forum-selection clause waives the possibility of a
§ 1404(a) transfer or a forum non conveniens dismissal in the second
state. Just as such a clause, when enforced, waives the defense of personal jurisdiction, it would seem to do the parties little good if, despite
the clause, battle ensues on other grounds. This argument has not,
however, been accepted in full. Case law permits the second state to
consider a transfer or dismissal, at least on grounds other than incon272. Supra Part I.B. See also Freer, supra note 83, at 1128-29 (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1406 (1988) as a method of transfer); Lederman, supra note 5, at 440-43 (same).
273. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29-31 (1988).
274. Among the factors courts consider are: "the forum actually chosen by the

plaintiff, the current convenience of the parties and witnesses, the current location of
pertinent books and records, similar litigation pending elsewhere, current docket

conditions, and familiarity of the potential courts with governing state law." Id. at 34
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the
Interests ofJustice, 66 NOTRE DAME L.

REV.

443 (1990).

275. The latter type of transfer would be permissible under the Uniform Transfer
of Litigation Act, adopted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in August of 1991. UNIF. TRANSFER OF LrrIGATION AcT, - U.L.A. - (1991).
For further discussion of the Uniform Act, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,Jurisdictionaland
Transfer Proposalsfor Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LrG. 325, 354-58 (1991).

276. E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1982). See generally Allan R.
Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of the Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U.
REv. 781 (1985).

277. Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
278. Id. at 241 n.6.
279. Id.

PA.

L.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 25

venience to the moving party. 28 0 This compromise is sound, for only
private interests should be waivable by a choice-of-forum clause. Factors other than convenience to the parties affect other individuals as well
as the court itself, and they thus involve the sort of structural interests
28l
that usually should not be waivable.
The Stewart decision, however, threw into some doubt the relevance
of a forum-selection clause to § 1404(a) analysis. Recall that the Court
held that the presence of such a clause was just one factor among several
to consider. Most courts seem to follow the Stewart mandate faithfully,
giving such clauses tie-breaking weight when addressing motions seek28 2
ing § 1404(a) transfers.
Other courts, however, seem unwilling to give choice-of-forum
clauses even the moderate weight required by Stewart. In Red Bull Assoc.
v. Best Western Int'l, Inc.,28 3 for example, Best Western decided to terminate its relationship with the Red Bull Motel. Red Bull brought suit in
federal court in New York, its place of business, alleging federal civil
rights violations. Best Western moved to transfer to Arizona under
§ 1404(a), citing a forum-selection clause designating that state, Best
Western's place of business, as the exclusive forum. 28 4 The Second Circuit upheld a denial of transfer, relying on the apparent inability or
unwillingness of Red Bull to pursue litigation in Arizona, 28 5 as well as
the imperative of encouraging private enforcement of the civil rights
laws.

2 86

The reasoning of Red Bull is unsound. It seems to gut the operation
of forum-selection clauses in virtually any federal question case providing for a private cause of action. Red Bull could still file a federal action
in Arizona because, as the district court acknowledged, the inconvenience to Red Bull could not cut in its favor.28 7 The only practical benefit
288
identified was Red Bull's desire to obtain a local jury in New York.
This desire is understandable, but it should not be enough to defeat the
enforcement of the clause, absent the showing of other factors relevant
to a § 1404(a) motion.
280. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990)
(discussion of § 1404(a)). Cf. Cutler, supra note 4, at 111 (stating, without elaboration, that forum non conveniens defense is still available in the second state).
281. Supra Part II.A.
282. E.g., Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1258 (4th Cir.
1991). See also Steinberg, supra note 274, at 518 (giving other examples); UNIF.
TRANSFER OF LITmGATION AcT, supra note 275, at § 104 commentary (stating that

forum-selection clause is one of several criteria to consider).
283. 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988). For other cases with results similar to Red Bull,
see BORN & WESniN, supra note 5, at 205-06; Lederman, supra note 5, at 436-38.
284. 862 F.2d at 964.
285. Id. at 966.
286. Id. at 967. Perhaps Red Bull obtained a Pyrrhic victory. It was recently
reported that Red Bull paid Best Western $215,000 to settle the suit on the eve of
trial (Best Western had counterclaimed). See Lisa W. Foderaro, Motel Retracts Charge
of Racism in Settlement of Best Western Suit, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 20, 1991, § 1, at 18.
287. 686 F. Supp. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988).
288. 686 F. Supp. at 452.
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At any rate, Red Bull appears to be anomalous. Given the frequency
of § 1404(a) motions, 28 9 courts should give forum-selection clauses
their appropriate weight in the post-Stewart world. 2 90 Likewise, a second
forum, considering a forum non conveniens motion, should consider
such clauses as considerably reducing the significance of the "alternative
forum" and "private interest" factors.
C. International Implications
As illustrated by The Bremen, choice-of-forum clauses may designate
a jurisdiction outside the United States as the site of litigation. And, as
The Bremen demonstrates, such clauses are often coupled with a choiceof-law clause selecting the law of the foreign forum. The Bremen2 9 1 and
later cases 29 2 nonetheless, in enthusiastically enforcing such clauses,
pointed to the need to facilitate international trade and to depart from
"provincial solicitude for the jurisdiction of domestic forums." 29 3
Such enthusiasm raises two problems, perhaps more starkly
presented than in wholly domestic litigation. The first issue concerns
the law applied in the alternative forum. If it differs from the American
law that might otherwise apply, then litigating elsewhere could evade
the regulatory purposes of such law. Second, and relatedly, the difficulties in litigating in another country may be so great that the opportunity
to litigate constitutes no remedy at all. Nevertheless, while these concerns are not without force, they are not compelling enough for American courts to deny enforcement carte blanche to any clause designating
a foreign forum.
The Bremen itself suggested that a choice-of-forum clause should not
be enforced if it "would contravene a strong public policy of the forum
in which suit is brought .... -294 Later cases hold that with respect to
federal causes of action, the plaintiff must be able to vindicate her rights
in the alternative forum, 2 95 and federal statutes must be able to serve
their remedial and deterrent functions. 2 9 6 Despite this expansive language, it appears that the "public policy" exception is fairly narrow,
289. See Steinberg, supra note 274, at 446 n.l 1 (reporting over 3000 such motions
in the federal courts in each of the fiscal years 1985 through 1989).
290. Judges, e.g.,Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
and commentators, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 274, at 521-23, have pointed out an
anomaly caused by Stewart. If a party seeks dismissal, then choice-of-forum clauses
are enforced with the vigor required by the The Bremen/Carnivalline of cases. On the
other hand, if transfer under § 1404(a) is sought, then Stewart reduces the clause to
one factor among many, decreasing the chances of enforcement.
291. 407 U.S. at 9, 13-14.
292. E.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-31 (1985). See also
RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 cmt.
h (1987) (general approval of forum-selection clauses).
293. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 630.
294. 407 U.S. at 15.
295. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37 & n.19.
296. Id. at 637 (discussing federal antitrust laws).
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requiring something more than mere difference in law, 29 7 assuming that
American law would apply in the first instance. 2 98 While American regulatory interests can be undermined by contracting out of American
law, 29 9 a blanket rule forbidding such a result would virtually negate the
use of choice-of-law clauses in the international context. In the absence
of greater harmonization and uniformity of regulatory law at the international level, American courts can serve both party expectation and
national interests by deferring to choice-of-law clauses unless the law
chosen plainly provides no remedy.
The enforcement of a clause designating a foreign forum raises
analogous issues. Here, the "seriously inconvenient" exception to The
Bremen and Carnival comes into play. As suggested earlier,3 0 0 that
exception will be difficult to make in the domestic context, given the
relative ease of communication and travel between states, and the ability
to retain local counsel in other states. The same factors may increase
the inconvenience if the chosen forum is in another country. It is not
surprising, then, that most of the cases in which courts have held the
chosen forum is seriously inconvenient involve foreign tribunals. 3 0
Other cases, however, do enforce clauses that designate a foreign
country as a forum.30 2 In these cases the party seeking to defeat the
clause is usually unable to demonstrate the inadequacy of the foreign
forum.30 3 Recent cases that enforce such clauses seem, for the most
part, to analyze the validity of the clause carefully, and to treat seriously
BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 201.
298. In The Bremen, for example, the Court was dubious that the American law,
apparently contrary to that of England, would in any event apply to the case. 407
U.S. at 15-16. See also EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230
(1991) (applying plain-statement rule to determine extraterritorial applicability of
federal legislation).
299. Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 63-66, 72-73

297.

(1991).
300. Supra Part II.C.

301. Perhaps the best known examples are cases arising after the Iranian hostage
crisis in the late 1970's, where courts refused to enforce clauses designating Iran as
the forum. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985). See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5,

at 199; Gruson, supra note 10, at 169 n.153.
For other examples, see Weidner Communications, Inc. v. H.R.H. Prince Bandar al

Faisal, 859 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to enforce forum-selection clause
designating Saudi Arabian courts); Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419 (1st
Cir. 1991) (same with respect to Turkish courts); BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at
199-200. See also id. at 230-42 (addressing adequate alternative forum jurisprudence
in the forum non conveniens doctrine).
302. For some recent examples, consider Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgt. Serv. Co.,
Inc., 926 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1991) (Saudi Arabian courts); Taag Linhas Aereas de
Angola v. Transamerica Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1990) (Swiss courts);
Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988) (Italian
courts), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Appell v. George Philip & Son, Ltd., 760
F. Supp. 167 (D. Nev. 1991) (English courts).

303. E.g., Spradlin, 926 F.2d at 868-69; Hodes, 858 F.2d at 915. Cf FED. R. Civ. P.
44.1 (placing burden on party who intends to raise issue concerning foreign law to
give reasonable notice before doing so).
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the claim that the foreign court is inconvenient.30 4 Put another way,
these courts have not blindly enforced contractual norms at the expense
of systemic regulatory concerns. Such a case-by-case approach can serve
and enforce appropriate contractual expectations of the parties, while
305
enabling reciprocity to develop at the international judicial level.
In his dissent in Carnival,Justice Stevens asked whether the forumselection clause would have been enforced, had it selected Panama
rather than Florida as the forum.3 0 6 Had that been the case, it would
have been incumbent on the Shutes to demonstrate that Panama was
seriously inconvenient, and to describe the implications of applying Panamanian law, assuming the court there would apply that law. Given
recent events in Panama, perhaps they could have discharged that burden. However Justice Stevens' question might be answered, the prospect of enforcing forum-selection clauses in these circumstances does
not delegitimatize the project of utilizing such clauses in international
litigation.
IV.

Privatizing Procedure

In the absence of forum-selection clauses, suits can only be brought in
jurisdictions having minimum contacts with the defendant. Defendants
who do not wish to be sued in that forum can contest jurisdiction by
filing a motion with the court. The judge then rules on the matter, usually in the form of a written opinion, which, at some point, can be
appealed.
This entire scheme is pretermitted by the use of an enforceable
choice-of-forum clause. In effect, the parties contract to privatize a matter of procedure heretofore exclusively decided by the judiciary. The
Bremen sanctioned this process for dealings between corporations. Carnival has now approved it for individual Americans dealing with large
multinational companies. Undoubtedly, critics of Carnival will wonder if
choice-of-forum clauses on the backs of tickets to Disneyworld or the
304. E.g., Taag, 915 F.2d at 1353-54; Hodes, 858 F.2d at 912-16.
305. There is an extensive literature applying game theory to international relations. E.g., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (K. Oye ed. 1986); Robert D. Keohane,
Reciprocity in InternationalRelations, 40 INr'L ORG. 1 (1986); Emerson M. Niou & Peter
C. Ordeshook, Stability in Anarchic International Systems, 84 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1207
(1990); Joshua S. Goldstein &John R. Freeman, U.S.-Soviet-Chinese Relations: Routine,
Reciprocity, or Rational Expectations?, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17 (1991).

With respect to jurisdictional issues, it is interesting to note that Great Britain and
France, with which the United States has considerable trade, have moved toward a
view of forum-selection clauses very similar to that of the United States in The Bremen.
See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAws 273-309 (1986) (English law); Cutler,
supra note 4, at 113-22 (French law); id. at 122-29 (English law); Cindy Noles, Note,
Enforcement of Forum-Selection Agreements in Contracts Between Unequal Parties, 11 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 693, 703-05 (1981) (German law). Cf Paul, supra note 299, at 49
(expressing doubts about effectiveness of reciprocity in this context); Weinberg, supra
note 153, at 71-72 (same).
306. 111 S. Ct. at 1533 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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like will be enforced.3 0 7 They will also wonder if other procedural
30 8
rights can similarly be commodified.
Critics of the privatization of procedure can draw on a considerable
literature developed by critics of ADR. In the forefront of the latter critique stand the adherents and teachers of metaprocedure.3 ° 9 These
writers contend that the analysis of civil litigation has for far too long
elevated procedure over substance. According to these critics, traditional thinking about civil procedure usually ignores the context in
which issues are decided. It often gives short shrift to the motivations,
bargaining power, and goals of the parties and their counsel; to the way
307. Cf. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting) (predicting that "[c]lauses like the one used against the
Szukhents . . . will soon find their way into the 'boilerplate' of everything from an
equipment lease to a conditional sales contract," and that it will give "a green light to
every large company in this country to contrive contracts" requiring individuals to
defend themselves "in some place, no matter how distant ... or else suffer a default
judgment.") Justice Black would probably say today that his predictions were confirmed in Carnival.
308. Other candidates for prospective waiver might be the constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial, cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 38 & 39 (permitting waiver ofjury right
under certain circumstances in pleadings or in other court proceedings), or various
procedural due-process protections, compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96
(1972) (finding conditional sales contract did not waive procedural due protections
because it was not clear and was contained in a form contract) with D.H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (opposite holding with respect to contract
between two corporations).
309. The term "metaprocedure," which apparently originated at Yale Law School,
refers to an approach to teaching civil procedure that looks beyond the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to a wider focus on fairness, substantive results, and the like. See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE LJ. 945 (1989) (book
review).
Most likely, metaproceduralists would be considered devotees of the New Public
Law. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991). The New Public Law
is a descendant of the Legal Process paradigm of Hart and Sacks, which dominated
much legal discourse in the 1950s and 1960s. That school emphasized rational
proceduralism and deference to institutional competence, while also calling for
appropriate change and reform in the law. Id. at 709-10. Legal Process came under
attack from both the right (law and economics) and the left (Critical Legal Studies) in
the 1970s and 1980s. Id. at 708. In response,
the New Public Law is unmistakably situated as a "center" between what is
perceived as an overly objectivist and conservative law and economics and an
overly confrontational and politicizing CLS. In our description, the New
Public Law contains two roughly distinct subgroups that echo this external
structure: New Public Law scholarship focusing on public choice theory and
on the "fit" of social problem and regulator mechanism is a subdued version
of the technocratic tendencies of the law-and-economics right; the emphasis
on indeterminacy and the inevitability of choice in a distinctly progressive
wing of New Public Law scholarship is likewise an echo of the left's emphasis
on the politics of social construction.
Id. at 709.
While, as the name implies, the New Public Law is not directly concerned with
private law as such, it would undoubtedly view with suspicion an effort to carve out
areas of due-process protections under the aegis of contract law. See Daniel A. Farber
& Phillip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New
Public Law, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 875, 884-87 (1991).
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a lawsuit is brought in the first place; and to the actual process of deci310
sion-making by the court, shorn of the exclusive focus on precedent.
Drawing on these concerns, these critics have questioned the infatuation of many lawyers and judges with ADR. They argue that justice,
not mere efficiency, should be the goal of adjudication. Under this view,
a settlement or a consent decree may be an inappropriate way to end
litigation, especially where there are distributional inequalities between
the parties, where non-parties will be significantly affected, or where
there is a need for an authoritative exposition of law, through a written
311
opinion by the judge.
Similar criticisms could be lodged at consensual procedure. The
valued features of procedure, giving autonomy to litigants and simultaneously empowering and placing constraints on judges,3 1 2 are apt to be
discarded in a regime ruled by consent. Given inequalities in bargaining
power, consent is likely to be illusory, 3 13 and privatization of procedure
can devalue due-process protections and ultimately lead to their
3 14
abandonment.
Although these arguments are not without force, they are not compelling when applied to forum-selection clauses. This conclusion follows for several reasons. First, the metaproceduralist critique carries
less force in a purely private piece of litigation.3 15 Whatever else might
be said about forum-selection clauses, they generally arise in litigation
like Carnival, with relatively little effect on third parties, as opposed to,
say, a class action. In such cases, authoritative pronouncements of law
are less important, and it seems difficult to believe that the stock of
precedents on personal jurisdiction issues is going to erode to an ineffi3 16
cient level.
Second, a forum-selection clause is, perhaps, a form of ADR, since
it resolves and renders unnecessary the judicial resolution of potential
legal issues. Yet such clauses also differ rather dramatically from other
310. Eskridge, supra note 309, at 950-51. Perhaps the most prominent exemplar of
these critics is the recent casebook by Owen Fiss, Judith Resnik, and the late Robert
Cover. See COVER ET AL., supra note 118.
311. See, e.g., Harry Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panaceaor Anathema?, 99
L. REV. 668, 676-79 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073,
1075 (1984); Eskridge, supra note 309, at 959.
312. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 845-58 (1984).
313. COVER ET AL., supra note 118, at 1570-72; Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 545 (1986).
314. Mullenix, supra note 25, at 366-72.
Given her critique of forum-selection clauses in Mullenix, supra note 25, Professor
Mullenix would have to be acknowledged as an adherent of the New Public Law as it
relates to procedure. See also Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (With Kindness) the Feliofic
Calculus of Civil Procedure,40 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1987). But see Linda S. Mullenix, God,
Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 1139, 1165-70 (1989) (book
HARV.

review both praising and criticizing COVER ET AL., supra note 118).
315. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 309, at 959 ("Like his public values thesis generally,
Fiss' anti-settlement thesis seems inapplicable to most lawsuits.") (footnote omitted).
316. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook,Justice and Contract, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 26-27
(analyzing Fiss's "too few precedents" thesis).

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 25

forms of ADR, since the parties to such a clause are not deprived of a
court forum, as is the case in, for example, arbitration. The parties still
have their day in court, albeit in a forum contractually agreed upon prior
to the dispute actually arising.
Nonetheless, the metaproceduralist critique can inform the careful
analysis of such clauses that Carnival and other cases require. For example, after Carnival,would the Shutes realistically have their day in a Florida court?3 17 Perhaps the decision would have been more satisfying if
we knew more about the context of the case. For example, why did the
Shutes pursue litigation in Washington? Was it merely to obtain a presumably favorable jury or were there other factors at play? What were
the actual costs, in time and money, of litigating across the continent?
Could the extra costs be recouped, after trial or through a settlement?
Would they have had to travel to Florida, except for the trial? Could the
testimony of witnesses, particularly those who were in Washington, be
presented by way of videotaped deposition? Would some of the depositions (for discovery purposes) be taken across the country in any event?
Would the Shutes be required to leave their state to be deposed? This is
some of the information that would inform a judgment of the "seriously
inconvenient" prong of The Bremen, as it applied in Carnival.
On a macro level, we might ask similar questions. Is the use of form
contracts, like the one in Carnival, likely to increase? Are consumers,
like the Shutes, helpless to deal with the situation? Before one answers
in the affirmative, we may want to know more about the particulars of
the contractual arrangements. Is it clear that traditional contract law
would always validate such clauses? To what extent might consumers (or
their surrogates in federal or state agencies) have the power to get some
legislative or executive response?318 At first, we might answer "not
much," but then we are reminded of the often extensive consumer-protection legislation passed at the federal and state levels, 3 19 and that certain form contracts, like cognovit notes,3 20 have been outlawed in
virtually all states. Perhaps it is not irrational to predict that certain
forum-selection clauses, if viewed as abusive, could be the subject of legislative regulation if the common law does not step in.
Finally, metaprocedure also reminds us of the value most Americans accord to procedural due-process protections. Empirical studies
demonstrate that most people view contested, adversary adjudication as
317. Perhaps we should also ask if there are other avenues available for the Shutes
to seek compensation-such as a suit against the travel agent. See, e.g., Fling v.
Hollywood Travel &Tours, 765 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ohio 1990), aff'd mem., 933 F.2d
1008 (6th Cir. 1991).
318. Cf. Farber & Frickey, supra note 309, at 898-99 (public choice considerations

can inform development of the common law).
319. See generally JOHN D. GALAMARI &JosEPH M.
ed. 1987).

PERILLO,

CONTRAcTs 429-34 (3d

320. WEINTRAUB, supra note 87, at 109. Another form of regulation would be to
require that standardized information be revealed in any forum-selection clause. See
POSNER,

supra note I 11, at 348-50.
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more fair and satisfying (whatever the outcome) than many forms of
ADR.3 2 1 Forum-selection clauses sit astride adjudication and ADR.
They commodify procedure while simultaneously empowering potential
litigants to resolve an issue ahead of time. The merits of the dispute are
still resolved in the usual adversarial process. The uneasy confluence of
values both served and undermined by such clauses suggests that some
middle path between invalidation and total deference to such clauses is
called for. This Article concludes that current doctrine, even as exemplified by Carnival, proceeds down that route.
Conclusion
The post-Carnivalera seems an apt time to revisit the workings of forumselection clauses. On the one hand, a case like The Bremen is virtually the
best-case scenario for the enforcement of such a clause. It concerned
two corporations of apparently equal bargaining power, which dickered
over the clause in their contractual negotiations. It is difficult to argue
that the selection of a neutral, English forum to resolve a dispute
between multinational enterprises is fundamentally unfair. In contrast,
Carnival seems the worst case with which to defend a choice-of-forum
clause. In that case, the clause was in the proverbial fine print of a nonnegotiated form contract between ordinary consumers and a large company. The clause required the consumers to litigate, if at all, across the
continent from their homes.
Despite these rather dramatic differences, this Article argues that
the results in both cases are correct. The rights waived by such clauses
are not immutable, and whether or not federal or state law is determined
to govern, ordinary principles of contract law are largely proper to
police such bargains. Exogenous values are served by the requirement
that the court depriving itself of the case determine that the chosen
forum is not seriously inconvenient to the parties, and by the option
retained by the receiving court to transfer or dismiss the case (ifit determines that it can be litigated more conveniently elsewhere). A healthy
but not blind deference to forum-selection clauses can serve the values
of enhancing the parties' contractual expectations, reducing litigation
over jurisdictional issues, and of respecting procedural due-process
protections.

321. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
LAW & Soc'y REv. 953 (1990); Tom R.
Tyler, What is ProceduralJustice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal
Procedures, 22 LAw & Soc'y REv. 103 (1988).
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